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Rediscovering Antitrust’s Lost Values 
THOMAS J. HORTON*
ABSTRACT 
This Article traces Congress’s consistent balancing and blending of 
social, political, moral, and economic values and objectives over the course 
of nearly 120 years of antitrust legislation.  As a starting point, a plethora of 
outstanding and insightful scholarship analyzing Congress’s objectives in 
passing the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts already exists.  Less studied, 
however, has been Congress’s more recent legislation, including the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act), and the 
National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004, to the 
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (NCRPA).  By analyzing the 
legislative histories of such antitrust legislation in detail, the author seeks to 
show that Congress has never identified any single economic value such as 
consumer welfare or allocative efficiency, as the sole guiding lodestar for 
American antitrust.  Rather, since 1890, Congress has successfully sought to 
blend and balance a complex set of social, political, moral, and economic 
ideals, values, and objectives in our antitrust laws.  
The author believes that it is time to deal with the real social, political, 
moral, and economic values conflicts in antitrust, instead of relying on 
neoconservative economic proxies that unilaterally declare the values debates 
to be scientifically and theoretically resolved.  Based on nearly 120 years of 
legislative history, the author concludes that we need to return to an antitrust 
regulatory system that better reflects Congress’s dynamic historical balancing 
and blending of multiple fundamental American social, political, moral, and 
economic values.  To do so, we must begin rediscovering antitrust’s lost 
values, and recommence our historic pursuit of an ethical, moral, and fair 
free-enterprise system truly devoted to the long-term economic and social 
welfare of all Americans. 
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It has become fashionable to boldly proclaim that American antitrust is 
edging closer and closer to a state of economic purity.  Antitrust, it is argued, 
is largely free today from the “pollution and dilution” caused by our historical 
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consideration of political, social, and moral values in earlier antitrust 
analyses.1  Such heady proclamations are based on the rapid ascendance over 
the last 40 years of neoclassical economics, which largely rule American 
antitrust today.2  In this theoretically pure economic world, American antitrust 
                                                          
1  See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: 
Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2406–07 (2013) (arguing that the 
“promotion of economic welfare as the lodestar of antitrust law—to the exclusion of 
social, political, and protectionist goals—[has] transformed the state of . . . [antitrust] 
law . . . .”); Theodore Voorhees, Jr., The Political Hand in American Antitrust—
Invisible, Inspirational, or Imaginary?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 557, 576 (2014) (arguing 
that “the powerful impact of economic thinking” in conjunction with other legal 
developments has yielded a body of economically-driven antitrust law that “is largely 
impervious to political intrusion”); Id. at 562 (arguing that “it is certainly fair to say 
that economics and its companion, empiricism, have largely displaced many of 
antitrust’s more familiar populist themes from prior years”); Maurice E. Stucke, 
Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 556 (2012) [hereinafter Stucke 
I] (discussing how, in recent years, some antitrust scholars and enforcers have “viewed 
antitrust’s more salient, political, social, and moral goals as somehow diluting antitrust 
policy”); Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and 
the Future Development of Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 388 
(2003) (arguing that limiting antitrust to economic goals and values frees antitrust 
analyses from normative judgments); William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: 
The Draftsman’s View, 71 CAL. L. REV. 618, 619 (1983) (“[W]here there is conflict, 
social and political goals should yield to economic considerations . . . .”); Darren Bush, 
Too Big to Bail, 77(1) ANTITRUST L. J. 277, 279 (2010) (describing efficiency as the 
“king” of antitrust); R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Remarks at the International Conference on Competition: Competition and Politics, 
at 6 (June 6, 2005) https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/competition-and-politics 
[https://perma.cc/8739-DJYH] (arguing that incorporating “extraneous social and 
political values” into antitrust will lead to outcomes that “will be polluted by values . 
. . that just do not belong in sound competition analysis”); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. 
Co. v. United States, 704 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The allocative-efficiency or 
consumer-welfare concept of competition dominates current thinking, judicial and 
academic, in the antitrust field.”).  
2  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter 
POSNER I] (“Almost everyone professionally involved in antitrust today—whether as 
litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic or informed observer—not only agrees that the 
only goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare, but also agrees 
on the essential tenets of economic theory . . . .”); Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, 
The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 471, 473 (2012) (arguing that the goals of antitrust must be “understood by 
economic analysis”); Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy 
Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2559 (2013) [hereinafter First & Waller] 
(discussing how the American judiciary “has made antitrust overly technical and 
overly dependent on economics”); Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Socio-Economic Approach 
to Antitrust: Unpacking Competition, Consumer Surplus, and Allocative Efficiency, 
49 AKRON L. REV. 409, 409 (2016) (“American antitrust law may be particularly 
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is now singularly dedicated to maximizing “consumer welfare” through an 
intense focus on promoting “allocative efficiency.”3  “Discussions of modern 
antitrust often emphasize its evolution, over the last several decades, into a 
rigorous economic discipline that is largely technocratic and apolitical.”4 
All is not well, however, in American antitrust’s neoclassical paradise.  
Ominously, there are rumblings that we may begin rediscovering our historical 
non-economic social, political, and moral antitrust values as we undertake 
future antitrust analyses.  One leading antitrust textbook warns:  
 
                                                          
representative of intellectual inertia.  For over 40 years, it has teetered between strict 
reliance on neoclassical economics and a deeply conservative political philosophy 
characterized, at its most benign, by a distrust of government.”); Thomas J. Horton, 
Fairness and Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective, 44 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 823, 825 (2013) [hereinafter Horton I] (arguing that “[e]conomics rules antitrust 
today”); Stucke I, supra note 1 at 563–66 (discussing the ascendance of Chicago 
School’s neoclassical economic theories in American jurisprudence since the late 
1970s). 
3  See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR 
WITH ITSELF 91 (1978) [hereinafter BORK I] (arguing that antitrust must be unified 
around the singular economic goal of “improve[ing] allocative efficiency “without 
impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no net gain or loss in 
consumer welfare”); POSNER I, supra note 2, at vii–ix (“[T]he disputants are in 
complete agreement . . . that considerations of allocative efficiency alone should guide 
antitrust policy.” (internal quotations omitted) (second alteration in original)); Reiter 
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the Sherman 
[Antitrust] Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 
704 F.2d at 376; Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 266 n.11 (1981) (arguing that “the antitrust laws should be 
treated as if they served no goal other than economic efficiency”); Albert Foer, On the 
Inefficiencies of Efficiency as the Single-Minded Goal of Antitrust, 60(2) ANTITRUST 
BULL. 103, 106 (2015) (arguing that the ascendance of “a single-minded drive for 
‘efficiency’ masks losses of other types of economic values, resulting in a skewing of 
economic analysis and policy outcomes”); Donald F. Turner, The Durability, 
Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987) 
(“The economic goal of [antitrust] policy is to promote consumer welfare through the 
efficient use and allocation of resources . . . .”). 
4  Marina Lao, Ideology Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 649, 
649 (2014); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking 
Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 305, 305 (1987) (“Antitrust has become . . . a branch of 
economics.”); First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2544 (describing the evolution of “an 
antitrust system captured by lawyers and economists advancing their own 
[technocratic] self-referential goals, free of political control and economic 
accountability”; which places “too much control in the hands of technical experts”); 
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 
948 (1979) [hereinafter Posner II] (“Differences remain, but increasingly they are 
technical rather than ideological.”). 
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The U.S. and other nations sometimes have used antitrust to 
promote non-economic goals . . . such as fairness, protection 
of small firms, social justice, equity, and political stability.  
These goals are ‘non-economic’ in the sense that they are 
concerned with values other than the well-being of consumers 
or the economy as a whole.5  
 
The textbook’s authors urge us to keep antitrust pure by continuing to 
“focus solely on economic goals—preventing the acquisition, maintenance, or 
exercise of market power.”6   
In a similar vein, an International Competition Policy Group, formed at 
the invitation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, released a Report on March 
14, 2017, warning that the use of antitrust law to achieve any objectives other 
than “sound, economics-based” goals “would interject harmful uncertainty 
into antitrust enforcement, detract from economic welfare, potentially be in 
tension with the rule of law, and, importantly, undermine longstanding U.S. 
efforts to advocate the consumer welfare approach overseas.”7  The Report 
expresses a deep fear of the growing interest in rediscovering antitrust’s lost 
                                                          
5  ANDREW I. GAVIL WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, JONATHON B. BAKER & JOSHUA D. 
WRIGHT, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN 
COMPETITION POLICY 35 (3d ed. 2017).  The authors add, “[d]efenders of an economic 
approach to antitrust assert that antitrust rules and exemptions guided by non-
economic values are usually inconsistent with economic interests and impose 
significant aggregate costs on consumers.  They also assert that such rules tend to be 
inflexible and prone to over-deterrence.”  Id. at 39. 
6  Id. at 40.  The authors additionally observe:   
 
Although courts sometimes have articulated non-economic goals for 
U.S. antitrust law, their reliance on such goals as a source of useful 
guidance for deciding particular cases has waned since the early 
1970s.  Non-economic goals frequently conflict with economic 
aims, provide too little guidance for antitrust decision makers, and 
arguably are ill-suited to decision-making processes that rely on 
adjudication and the adversary system.  It is equally important to 
appreciate that this was not always the case in the United States, may 
still not be the case in some isolated circumstances, and may not be 
the case universally in the world today.   
 
Id. at 40–41.  
7  International Competition Policy Expert Group: Report and 
Recommendations, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Mar. 14, 2017), at 18, 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/icpeg_recommendations_and_report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/L65H-HSNW]. 
184    UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 16, No. 2 
 
social, political, and moral values,8 sinisterly noting, “[p]roblematically, in 
some matters, competition authorities (including those in the United States) 
appear to have pursued investigations well beyond the point where objective 
review would indicate either that the suspected conduct did not occur as 
initially anticipated, or that such conduct poses no substantial threat to 
competition.”9  The Report worrisomely concludes that “the United States 
confronts a situation in which many jurisdictions fall far short of employing 
an economics-based, consumer welfare-oriented approach to competition law 
enforcement focused on preserving a vigorous competitive process.”10  
                                                          
8  Id. at 21 (“While a number of jurisdictions have begun to speak seriously about 
the merits of an economics-based consumer welfare approach, those principles are not 
embraced by many other jurisdictions.”).  The Report solemnly adds: 
 
In addition, even where there is some positive recognition of the 
[economic] approach, it is not applied consistently in case law and 
agency decision-making.  Too few jurisdictions have prominent 
roles for economists trained to understand problems of industrial 
organization.  Even jurisdictions regarded as mature, like the 
European Union, have created important roles for economists only 
recently, and the impact of economic analysis on the resolution of 
specific matters remains unclear. . . . Without the discipline of close 
review by expert economists and other officials empowered and 
motivated to apply rigorous scrutiny to proposed enforcement 
initiatives, competition authorities often become comfortable with 
an unjustifiably more interventionist view of enforcement. . . . 
Where this occurs, competition authorities can tend to discount the 
costs and disruption that their enforcement activities impose on 
legitimate business conduct, give too little weight [to] the costs of 
wrongfully condemning conduct that is procompetitive, and 
exaggerate the likelihood and consequences of wrongfully 
exonerating conduct that might have anticompetitive impact.  
 
Id. at 21–22. 
9  Id.  
10  Id. at 23.  It is important to note that in a “Separate Statement” appended to the 
Report, Professor Eleanor Fox observed: 
 
I do not believe that the United States has the one right mold for 
antitrust rules and standards or for the antitrust/intellectual property 
interface, although much wisdom can be found in U.S. law.  In my 
view we should respect different views and different circumstances 
and thus recognize the legitimacy of other approaches as long as 
they are applied with transparency, proportionality, due process, and 
non-discrimination.  
 
Id. at 33.  
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The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other supporters of neoconservative 
American antitrust economics have good reason to be alarmed.  Progressive 
antitrust scholars increasingly have begun challenging neoconservatives’ 
ongoing attempts to excise our supposedly “non-economic” historic social, 
political, and moral values and goals from our antitrust analyses and 
regulations.  Professor Marina Lao observes that “some antitrust scholars 
would preserve a limited role for other values11 [while] others challenge the 
central role of economics more frontally.”12  Distinguished antitrust Professor 
Eleanor Fox, for example, has argued that “[i]f pressed to take account of 
harms beyond output restraint . . . , jurists may find that they can advance 
values of antitrust law—diversity, opportunity, fair process, choice, and fairer 
distribution—without also raising the costs of goods and services to 
consumers.”13  Professor and former Federal Trade Commission Chairman 
Robert Pitofsky similarly adds, “[i]t is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to 
exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws.”14  Suggesting 
                                                          
11  Lao, supra note 4, at 649–50 (citing Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of 
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051–52 (1979)) (agreeing that economic 
considerations should be paramount in antitrust analyses, but arguing that non-
economic political values also must be considered). 
12  Id. at 650 (citing Maurice E. Stucke, Should Competition Policy Promote 
Happiness? 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2575, 3578 (2013) [hereinafter Stucke II]); Stucke 
I, supra note 1; Bush, supra note 1, at 281–85; First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2543.  
This author similarly has argued at length for a less neoclassical economics-oriented 
approach to antitrust.  See, e.g., Horton I, supra note 2; Thomas J. Horton, Restoring 
American Antitrust’s Moral Arc, 62 S.D. L. REV. 11 (2017) [hereinafter Horton II]; 
Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of 
the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and 
Behavioral Analyses, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469 (2011) [hereinafter Horton III]; Thomas 
J. Horton, Unraveling the Chicago/Harvard Antitrust Double Helix: Applying 
Evolutionary Theory to Guard Competitors and Revive Antitrust Jury Trials, 41 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 615 (2012) [hereinafter Horton IV]. 
13  Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision 
Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 584 (1986) (emphasis in 
original). 
14  Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1051.  Professor Pitofsky explains: 
 
By “political values,” I mean, first, a fear that excessive 
concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political 
pressures, and second, a desire to enhance individual and business 
freedom by reducing the range within which private discretion by a 
few in the economic sphere controls the welfare of all.  A third and 
overriding political concern is that if the free-market sector of the 
economy is allowed to develop under antitrust rules that are blind to 
all but economic concerns, the likely result will be an economy so 
dominated by a few corporate giants that it will be impossible for 
the state not to play a more intrusive role in economic affairs.  
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that “economics and empiricism do not provide answers to all questions arising 
in antitrust law,”15  Professor Lao insightfully suggests that it is time for a 
discourse that “bring[s] to the fore the ideological underpinnings of the 
conservative and liberal divide, and to have a normative conversation based 
on the [various] value[s] differences rather than rely on economic theories as 
proxies for discussion.”16 
The purpose of this Article is to further Professor Lao’s recommended 
discourse by tracing Congress’s consistent balancing of social, political, 
moral, and economic values and objectives over the course of more than a 
century of antitrust legislation.  This Article will examine Congress’s 
balancing of diverse fundamental values between the passage of: 1) the 
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890;17 2) the Clayton and Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) Acts in 1914;18 3) the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 
(HSR Act);19 4) the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (NCRA);20 
and 5) the National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004,21 
which amended the NCRA to create the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act (NCRPA). 
As a starting point, a plethora of outstanding and insightful scholarship 
analyzing Congress’s objectives in passing the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC 
Acts already exists.  Less studied, however, has been Congress’s more recent 
antitrust legislation, including the HSR Act and the NCRA.  By analyzing such 
legislation, the author seeks to show that from Congress’s long-term 
perspective, political, social, moral, and economic values are not viewed as 
emanating from distinct and rigid ideological spheres.  Rather they derive from 
interdependent and overlapping fundamental long-term core and shorter-term 
                                                          
 
Id. 
15  Lao, supra note 4, at 684.  
16  Id. at 685; see also Harrison, supra note 2, at 431 (observing that “the primary 
function of socio-economics is to ask questions and broaden the discussion”). 
17  Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 1–7 (2012)). 
18  Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012)); Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
41–58 (2012)); see also Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 
1125 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18) (amending 38 Stat. 209). 
19  Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 
90 Stat. 1390, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §18a).  
20  National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306 (2012)).  
21  Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-237, Title I, §§ 101–108, 118 Stat. 661, 661–65 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 4301–4306); National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306).  
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flexible American values.  It will be seen that Congress has never identified 
any single economic value, such as consumer welfare or allocative efficiency, 
as the sole guiding lodestar for American antitrust.  Instead, for more than 100 
years, Congress has sought to balance a complex set of democratic ideals, 
values, and objectives in our antitrust laws.  
Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and 
blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create 
a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and 
changing economic and political circumstances.22  Part II.A. briefly reviews 
some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values 
and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and 
FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political, 
social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust 
legislation.23  Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates 
undergirding the passage of the HSR Act.24  Part II.C. then turns to the debates 
and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent 
National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004.25 
Part III compares Congress’s balancing of social, political, moral and 
economic values, goals, and objectives between 1890 and 2004 to show how 
our antitrust laws were never intended to identify or pursue any single set of 
so-called economic values.26 This Article therefore disputes the currently in 
vogue assertions of Judges Posner, Bork, and Easterbrook that “although 
noneconomic objectives are frequently mentioned in the legislative histories, 
it seems that the dominant legislative intent has been to promote some 
                                                          
22  See infra Part II (discussing congressional intent of historical antitrust 
legislation).  
23  See infra Part II.A. (highlighting scholarship on congressional balancing of 
values regarding antitrust legislation). 
24  See infra Part II.B. (detailing congressional debates surrounding HSR Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1976). 
25  See infra Part II.C. (describing legislative history of NCRA and its subsequent 
amendments). 
26  See infra Part III.  This section builds upon an impressive array of antitrust 
scholarship discussing Congress’s blending and balancing of political, moral, social, 
and economic values to pursue multiple competition objectives.  See, e.g., RICHARD 
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 227–45 (1955) [hereinafter HOFSTADTER I]; 
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 195 (Vintage 
Books 1st ed. 2008) [hereinafter Hofstadter II]; HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 120, 165 (1955); 
Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 
YALE L.J. 207, 216–24 (1927); Steven C. Salop, What Consensus? Why Ideology and 
Elections Still Matter to Antitrust, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 601, 602–07 (2014); Fox, supra 
note 13, at 578; Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1051–60; Stucke I, supra note 1, at 559–
68; Stucke II, supra note 12, at 2637–44. 
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approximation to the economist’s idea of competition viewed as a means 
toward the end of maximizing efficiency.”27 
Part III argues that in promulgating antitrust legislation, Congress 
historically has carefully and judiciously balanced a diverse array of 
potentially conflicting fundamental American values.28  In so doing, Congress 
has sought to create and bolster an enlightened system of capitalism dedicated 
to supporting and encouraging economic growth within a competitive 
economic system designed to also protect such sacred American values as 
equality of opportunity, diversity, and economic ethics and morality.  Congress 
has never been concerned that paying homage and deference to our sacred 
social, moral, and political values in antitrust legislation would somehow 
pollute or dilute America’s economic agenda or values.  Rather, Congress has 
recognized that a careful balancing and blending of our diverse fundamental 
values, goals, and objectives would best protect and promote America’s 
economic, political, and social welfare.  
Part IV then addresses the issue of whether so-called economic values such 
as efficiency and consumer welfare truly are distinct and separable from our 
social, political, and moral values.29  Tracing the history and growth of such 
economic values and objectives, Part IV describes how they actually are socio-
economic derivatives of nineteenth-century social Darwinism and its attendant 
laissez-faire economic philosophies.  These ideas are as much about social, 
political, and moral philosophies as they are about pure economics.  
Recognizing this, Congress has never adopted explicitly or implicitly in its 
antitrust regulations the misguided social, political, moral, or economic 
philosophies and values of social Darwinism or laissez-faire.30   
 
                                                          
27  RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 20 (1976) 
[hereinafter POSNER III]; see also Robert H. Bork, Legislative History and the Policy 
of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 26 (1966) [hereinafter Bork II] (concluding that 
the legislative history of the Sherman Act showed that Congress was primarily 
concerned with enhancing economic efficiency); Frank Easterbrook, Workable 
Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1703 (1986) [hereinafter Easterbrook] 
(“However you slice the legislative history, the dominant theme is the protection of 
consumers from overcharges.  This turns out to be the same program as one based on 
‘efficiency.’”). 
28  See infra Part III. 
29  See infra Part IV (comparing economic values with social, political, and moral 
values). 
30  But see First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2548–49, 2558 (recognizing that “[t]he 
modern Supreme Court has come to be unmoored from any sense of legislative 
direction of judicial decision making, when it comes to interpreting the antitrust laws,” 
but arguing “that Congress has acquiesced in its own marginalization”); Harrison, 
supra note 2, at 422 (“The guiding principle of today’s antitrust approach of the 
Supreme Court is much more aligned with doing nothing . . . . In the end, it reflects a 
deep-seated distrust of government involvement in economic affairs.”). 
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE VALUES REFLECTED IN OUR ANTITRUST 
LAWS 
 
For nearly 100 years, numerous brilliant and accomplished antitrust 
scholars have fiercely debated Congress’s antitrust objectives as expressed in 
the early antitrust statutes’ legislative histories.  This is neither surprising nor 
troubling, since America has never been “a nation placidly evolving without 
serious disagreements.”31  Much of this scholarship seeks to shed light upon 
the “complex and diverse intellectual influences”32 emanating from a variety 
of “implicit or explicit community values.”33 
The difficulty in interpreting Congress’s legislative intent is exacerbated 
by several key factors.  First, antitrust law inevitably “encounters contradictory 
attitudes by those affected by it.”34  Second, economic decision-making 
invariably requires normative values judgments.35  And third, different 
                                                          
31  ERIC FONER, Introduction to RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN 
AMERICAN THOUGHT xxv (Beacon Press ed., 1992) [hereinafter HOFSTADTER III 
(Beacon Press ed., 1992)].  See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM 
IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1944) [hereinafter HOFSTADTER III]. 
32  William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law 
for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 1, 11 (2007) (observing that current antitrust policy debates “incorrectly 
attribute[] antitrust perspectives to a single source when they instead stemmed from 
more complex and diverse intellectual influences”). 
33  Allen Fels, A Model of Antitrust Regulatory Structure, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 489, 
498 (2010) (observing that “[t]he community is the ultimate arbiter of public value” 
and that “[i]ts preferences are expressed through legislation, rules and other directives 
. . . as well as many implicit or explicit community values.”). 
34  Id. at 499. 
35  See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE 
CREATION OF PROSPERITY xiii (1995) (arguing that economics “is grounded in social 
life and cannot be understood separately from the larger question of how modern 
societies organize themselves”); Walter Adams & James Brock, Antitrust, Ideology 
and the Arabesques of Economic Theory, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 327 [hereinafter 
Adams & Brock I] (arguing that “resolving antitrust issues calls for judgment. And 
that judgment is—and must be—informed as much by sociopolitical values as it is by 
economic facts and theory”); Jennifer K. Alexander, The Concept of Efficiency: An 
Historical Analysis, in PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING SCIENCES, 
vol. 9, 1007–08 (Anthonie Meijers ed., 2009) (“[E]fficiency in this common sense 
generally denotes approval: better efficient than not.); Oliver Goodenough, Values, 
Mechanism Design, and Fairness, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF 
VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 228 (Paul J. Zak, ed., 2008) (“Economic theorists have 
generally underestimated values as critical elements in human choice and behavior.”); 
Foer, supra note 3, at 116 (arguing that “economics is a social science, not a natural 
science and definitely not a subdiscipline of mathematics”); Fox, supra note 13, at 576 
(arguing that “the economic analyst called upon to aid in the solution of legal problems 
is forced to make judgments that economics does not and cannot provide”); Lao, supra 
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individuals “bring different ideological views to bear on antitrust 
enforcement.”36  Consequently, it is hardly surprising or troubling that there 
are so many conflicting scholarly interpretations of the legislative histories of 
America’s core antitrust statutes.  
 
A. America’s Early Antitrust Laws 
 
Given the diverse array of excellent scholarship addressing the legislative 
histories of Congress’s early antitrust legislation, including the Sherman, 
Clayton, and FTC Acts, a full review is beyond the scope of this Article.  
However, a brief review of that scholarship will be useful for demonstrating 
how Congress historically has balanced a diverse array of often conflicting 
fundamental implicit and explicit American communal and market values in 
seeking to regulate American economic competition.  
Turning first to scholarship focusing on Congress’s economic objectives, 
neoconservatives today frequently proclaim that a broad consensus has 
congealed around their view that Congress crafted its early antitrust statutes as 
consumer welfare prescriptions designed to maximize consumer welfare and 
allocative efficiency.37  In the words of Judge Robert Bork, “[t]he only 
legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of consumer 
welfare.”38  Indeed, neoconservative scholars have been outspoken in 
proclaiming that Congress was necessarily focused on increasing economic 
efficiency.39   
                                                          
note 4, at 666 (arguing that “it is almost inevitable that consciously or unconsciously, 
ideology will come into play in one’s approach to exclusionary conduct”); Stucke I, 
supra note 1, at 604 (“Even if antitrust technocrats, for normative reasons, limit 
antitrust to economic goals, they cannot avoid noneconomic values”). 
36  Salop, supra note 26 at 602; see also Lao, supra note 4, at 666 (discussing how 
ideology and values impact one’s “perspectives on the proper role of antitrust”). 
37  See sources cited supra notes 3 and 27; see also 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 
149 n.2 (1980); P. AREEDA, L. KAPLOW & A. EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: 
PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES 486 (6th ed. 2004) (discussing the arguments that “the 
noneconomic motives for [antitrust] legislation are less important than serving the 
economic function or that pursuing competitive prices and efficiency actually serves 
the broader objectives to the extent Congress intended;” and that “the difficulty of 
formulating standards to serve the broader objectives may leave the courts, by default, 
with those of the economic model of competition: allocative efficiency, innovation, 
and consumer welfare”); Bork II, supra note 27, at 7. 
38  BORK I, supra note 3, at 51. 
39  See, e.g., POSNER III, supra note 27, at 20; Easterbrook I, supra note 27, at 
1703–04; Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections 
on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1980) (“Preoccupation with 
efficiency is changing the law.”).  Professor Sullivan adds: 
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A number of scholars have accepted the premise “that Congress passed the 
antitrust laws to further economic objectives,”40 but disputed the precise nature 
of Congress’s economic objectives.  Professor Robert Lande, for example, has 
brilliantly argued that Congress passed the early antitrust laws primarily to 
promote economic “objectives of a distributive rather than of an efficiency 
nature.”41  Professor Lande extensively reviewed the legislative histories of the 
Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts, and eloquently defended his thesis “that the 
antitrust laws were passed primarily to further what may be called a 
distributive goal, the goal of preventing unfair acquisitions of consumers’ 
wealth by firms with market power.”42  
Professor and economist Jonathan Baker more recently argued that “[t]he 
best interpretation of the understanding of antitrust’s original generation is 
neither Judge Bork’s nor Professor Lande’s.”43  Instead, Professor Baker 
believes that “the Sherman Act was understood then as protecting natural 
rights to economic liberty, security of property, and the process of free and 
competitive exchange from artificial interference by private actors . . . .”44  
Ultimately, Professor Baker asserts that “[s]o long as competition policy 
remains the product of a political understanding aimed at capturing economic 
efficiencies, as it should, economic analysis will remain the essence of antitrust 
policy, enforcement, and litigation.”45 
                                                          
The current Supreme Court has issued several revisionist decisions.  
It has expanded the scope of the rule of reason and reduced the reach 
of per se rules, thus calling for fewer rules and more analysis.  At 
the same time it has narrowed inquiry under the rule of reason.  Only 
competitive effects are relevant.  This usually means efficiency 




40  Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of 
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 68 (1982). 
41  Id. 
42  Id. at 69–70; see also id. at 151 (“Congress wanted to encourage economic 
efficiency and to ensure that the fruits of this efficiency were passed on to consumers, 
but efficiency was never its primary goal.  Congress attempted to accomplish its 
overriding redistributive aims in such a way that the benefits of modern productivity 
would still be realized.”). 
43  Jonathon B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and 
Future of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2177 (2013). 
44  Id.  Professor Baker further posits that “the dispute over antitrust’s origins is 
largely irrelevant to the goals of modern antitrust because the contemporary Supreme 
Court has accepted the Sherman Act’s ‘dynamic potential.’”  Id. (citing Bus. Elecs. 
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988)). 
45  Id. at 2196.  Professor Baker adds that his “vision of antitrust’s goals and future 
recognizes the political context of antitrust while simultaneously embracing the central 
role of economics in the field.”  Id.  
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Professor Robert Pitofsky agrees with Professor Baker that economic 
concerns should “remain paramount,”46 and urges that “[t]he issue among most 
serious people has never been whether non-economic considerations should 
outweigh significant long-term economies of scale . . . ” in interpretations of 
the antitrust laws and concrete antitrust analyses.47  But he cautions that “the 
trend toward use of an exclusively economic approach to antitrust analysis 
excludes important political considerations that have in the past been seen as 
relevant by Congress and the courts.”48  Coming from a somewhat different 
economic direction, Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp recognize the 
numerous legislative statements of concern “that the trusts (a) raised prices and 
(b) injured others.”49  But Congress’s “most important and perhaps most 
troublesome conclusion is that while the framers of the Sherman Act were 
intent on condemning ‘monopoly,’ they saw the principal injury of monopoly 
as reaching competitors rather than consumers . . . .”50  Turning to other early 
antitrust legislation, Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp note that their 
legislative histories “offer little aid in identifying the fundamental interests that 
antitrust policy should protect[,]”51 and attribute to the legislative histories 
“little weight on the fundamental question of whether economic efficiency, 
injury to competitors, or some alternative ‘populist’ goal should guide antitrust 
policy.”52  Consequently, they go on to chide judges “[who] sometimes talk as 
if Congress has already decided the [antitrust] question before them.”53   
                                                          
46  Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1075. 
47  Id. at 1051.  
48  Id. at 1075.  Professor Pitofsky adds, “[s]uch considerations as the fear that 
excessive concentration of economic power will foster antidemocratic political 
pressures, the desire to reduce the range of private discretion by a few in order to 
enhance individual freedom, and the fear that increased governmental intrusion will 
become necessary if the economy is dominated by a few, can and should be feasibly 
incorporated into the antitrust question.”  Id.  
49  P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 43 (4th ed. 2013). 
50  Id. at 42–43.  Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp additionally observe, “[a] 
substantial history of sources other than the legislative debates suggests that the 
proponents of the Sherman Act were significantly more concerned about injury to 
competitors than injury to consumers.”  Id. at 55. 
51  Id. at 62. 
52  Id. at 63.  The authors emphasize “that the common law process of making 
[antitrust] law ultimately was both intended by the antitrust enactments and has 
occurred.”  Id. at 64. 
53  Id.  The authors believe that attempts to derive judicial decisions from the 
antitrust acts’ legislative histories “can be mischievous when it is a substitute for 
thought and analysis.  The judge who really thinks that Congress has already decided 
the matter at issue is not likely to think very long or hard about the conclusion, for 
which he erroneously supposes that he is not responsible.”  Id.  
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Other scholars and commentators have focused on the various implied and 
explicit social, political, and moral values that drove our early antitrust 
legislation.  Perhaps most famously, historian Richard Hofstadter has observed 
that monopolies and trusts were viewed as violating Progressives’ “inherited 
precepts and their moral preferences.”54  As a result:  
 
The Progressive case against business organization was not 
confined to economic considerations, nor even to the more 
intangible sphere of economic morals. Still more widely felt 
was a fear that the great business combinations, being the only 
center of wealth and power, would be able to lord it over all 
other interests and thus put an end to traditional American 
democracy.55 
 
Professor Hofstadter saw America’s early “antimonopoly tradition” as 
resting “intellectually upon [both] classical economic theory and upon the 
pluralism of American democratic thought.”56  Consequently, he opined, the 
original goals of antitrust were economic, political, and social.57  Professor 
Hofstadter ironically added, “[a]mong the three, the economic goal was the 
most cluttered with uncertainties, so much so that it seems to be no 
exaggeration to regard antitrust as being essentially a political rather than an 
economic enterprise.”58  
Professor Hofstadter built upon the work of Wisconsin Professor Hans B. 
Thorelli, who recognized in 1955 that the study of economic policy “runs the 
risk of becoming sterile unless a synthesis is attempted from time to time on 
the basis of knowledge made available and systematized by such differing 
social sciences as law, economics, history, political science, and the study of 
                                                          
54  HOFSTADTER I, supra note 26, at 243. 
55  Id. at 227.  Professor Hofstadter added that Progressives, “were trying, in short, 
to keep the benefits of the emerging organization of life and yet to retain the scheme 
of individualistic virtues that [business] organization was destroying.”  Id. at 217.  
56  Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in 
HOFSTADTER II, supra note 26, at 195.  
57  Id. at 199–200. 
58  Id. at 200.  Professor Hofstadter elaborated:  
 
The second class of goals was political; the antitrust principle was 
intended to block private accumulations of power and protect 
democratic government.  The third was social and moral; the 
competitive process was believed to be a kind of disciplinary 
machinery for the development of character, and the 
competitiveness of the people—the fundamental stimulus to 
national morale—was believed to need protection.   
 
Id.  
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public opinion.”59  Noting that Congress “considered one antimonopoly bill 
after another without ever . . . calling on the advice of professional 
economists,”60  Professor Thorelli opined that solid antitrust analyses were 
“eminently a matter of values.”61  Indeed, Professor Thorelli felt that the early 
American trusts and monopolies engendered “widespread public discontent 
and frustration,” as a result of the “conflict between some of the most ingrained 
ideas of the American people on the nature and workings of the political 
economy and the actual economic, technical, and institutional developments 
in certain fields . . . .”62  
Other antitrust scholars have picked up these themes.  For example, 
Professor Rudolph Peritz has posited that antitrust legislation had to deal with 
“an underlying conflict, a fundamental disagreement about the political 
economy of competition. . . . between factions holding opposing views of 
society.”63  Professor Peritz believed that “[i]n a fundamental sense, current 
antitrust policy reflects longstanding tensions between public policies favoring 
competitive markets and those favoring private rights of property and 
contract.”64  Criticizing the manner in which antitrust’s “political sphere has 
come to be identified as an economic domain,”65 Professor Peritz urged that 
                                                          
59  THORELLI, supra note 26, at vii.  
60  Id. at 120. 
61  Id. at viii (“Just where and how the balance between principles of cooperation 
and competition should be struck in different fields is, of course, eminently a matter 
of values.”). 
62  Id. at 165.  Presaging Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp, Professor Thorelli 
insightfully added, “[t]he fact that numerous and variegated attempts have been made 
to ‘map’ the intentions of the 51st Congress without any one investigator producing 
results generally accepted as conclusive appears to confirm the view that complete 
success is unattainable.”  Id. at 214.  
63  RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, 
RHETORIC, LAW 34 (rev. ed. 2000). Professor Peritz explained: 
 
On the one side, the Literalists believed that the policy directing 
the antitrust laws should rest upon free and unrestricted 
competition among roughly equal market participants, among 
independent entrepreneurs or free workmen, whether or not the 
consequence in any particular transaction was fair or reasonable.  
On the other [hand], the advocates of a Rule of Reason urged that 
antitrust policy should tolerate large consolidations of capital and 
allow private agreements that restrain trade when the agreements 
protect a fair return on property or some other traditional exercise 
of freedom of contract.  
 
Id. (alteration in original). 
64  Id. at 305. 
65  Id. at 302.  
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“[f]or competition policy to remain a durable good, it must reflect a dialogical 
sense of political economy.”66  
A diverse array of progressive antitrust scholars and commentators agree 
that our antitrust laws reflect a careful balancing of diverse social, political, 
moral, and economic goals.  Professor William S. Comanor, for example, 
observes that “[a]ntitrust is not immune to the clash of conflicting interests, 
and indeed it represents, to a substantial extent, a political accommodation 
among various groups.”67  Thus, “[t]hose who look for a single-minded 
purpose in antitrust are inevitably frustrated.”68  
Professors Maurice Stucke, Eleanor Fox, and Harry First concur.  
Professor Stucke, for example, has repeatedly described how antitrust 
historically has sought to promote diverse political, social, and moral goals in 
order to strengthen America’s economic system.69  Professor Fox similarly has 
described Congress’s antitrust goals of promoting and protecting “pluralism, 
entrepreneurial freedom, opportunity to compete, access to the market, 
freedom from exploitation, and fair process.”70  Meanwhile, Professor Harry 
                                                          
66  Id. at 303; see also Sullivan, supra note 39, at 4.  Professor Sullivan similarly 
observed: 
 
The Warren Court was the custodian of a multivalued antitrust 
tradition.  To that Court, the idea of competition included political 
and social objectives.  Among those were easing market access, 
protecting dealer independence, promoting good faith in 
transactions, and correcting extreme disparities in bargaining power.  
The Warren Court also was interested in assuring, on grounds of 
equity and fairness, and regardless of supposed impact on resource 
allocation, that prices be related to cost.  It sought each of these goals 
as an end in itself. Competition could foster all of them. 
 
Id. at 4.  Professor Sullivan added, “[c]ontext was important.  The interests involved 
were identified: the strength of values pointing toward one resolution was measured 
against the strength of those pointing toward another.”  Id.   
67  William S. Comanor, Antitrust in a Political Environment, 27 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 733, 734 (1982).  
68  Id. at 751.  Professor Comanor adds that antitrust “can never be a precise policy 
tool designed to achieve specific objectives: whether the economist’s concept of 
economic efficiency or some other.”  Id.  
69  See, e.g., Stucke II, supra note 27, at 2580.  Professor Stucke adds that 
“competition law has had, and will always have, multiple economic, political, social, 
and moral objectives.”   Id. at 2578.  Indeed, “[c]ompetition policy historically sought 
to promote political, social, and moral values of fair competition, dispersal of 
economic power, and promoting economic opportunity and individual autonomy.”  Id. 
at 2637; see also Stucke I, supra note 1, at 560–62 (enumerating diverse social, 
political, and moral concerns that the Supreme Court has gleaned over the years in 
reviewing the Sherman Act’s legislative history). 
70  Fox, supra note 13, at 566–67.  Looking specifically at the Clayton Act, 
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First persuasively posits that “[s]omething other than technical analysis is thus 
needed to make [antitrust] decisions.  And the choice of the core concepts on 
which to focus antitrust enforcement is the product of political values, not 
technical decisions.”71  
What are we to make of all this outstanding legal and historical scholarship 
reaching conflicting conclusions as to Congress’s legislative intents in its early 
antitrust statutes?  Perhaps the reason that no definitive single conclusion or 
set of conclusions can be reached is that Congress, like it so often must do, had 
to balance different social, political, moral and economic values, objectives 
and visions in order to pass antitrust legislation that could pass the tests of 
time.  Reviewing the extensive legislative histories and debates, it can be seen 
that the proponents of our early antitrust statutes shared such explicit and 
implied values as a belief in fair competition (equality of opportunity), 
economic diversity, and economic fairness through government oversight.  
Meanwhile, the opponents shared such express and implied values as 
efficiency through economic concentration, freedom of contract, protection of 
private property rights, and neo-Darwinian notions of “survival of the fittest.”  
Nearly 120 years after the passage of the Sherman Act, these battles rage on 
with no definitive conclusions yet attained.  As observed in Parts II.B. and C. 
below, more recent congressional antitrust debates have sparked similar values 
clashes, and required Congress to carefully and delicately balance diverse 
social, political, moral and economic goals and objectives.72   
 
B. American Values and the Premerger Notification Requirements of the 
HSR Act of 1976 
 
 Decades of efforts to reform, modernize, and improve the Progressive 
                                                          
Professor Fox finds that “[i]ts major goals were to preserve diversity, to decentralize 
power for social and political reasons, and probably, but less explicitly, to prevent 
exploitation of consumers.”  Id. at 578.  Professor Fox adds that “[i]n short, allocative 
efficiency was never a self-conscious goal of the Congresses that enacted and 
strengthened the antitrust laws.”  Id. at 566.  
71  Harry First, Bring Back Antitrust!, THE NATION (May 15, 2008), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/bring-back-antitrust/ [https://perma.cc/YX4A-
VHY4]; see also First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2544 (“The institutional aspects of 
today’s antitrust enterprise . . . are increasingly out of balance, threatening the 
democratic, economic, and political goals of the antitrust laws.”); Frederick M. Rowe, 
The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law of 
Economics 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1567 (1984) (“Yet antitrust, as a ‘charter of freedom,’ 
can perform a vital role for an entrepreneurial, pluralistic society: to mitigate the 
paradox of order and change, maintaining a balance of enterprise and power serving 
the felt needs of a given age.  Consonant with its formative themes of pragmatism, 
pluralism, and distrust of power, antitrust is hardly definable by monopoly meters that 
count what is assumed, not shown, to exist.”). 
72  See infra Parts II.B.–C. (illuminating recent antitrust congressional debates). 
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Era’s Clayton Act73 and the subsequent 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act74 
culminated in 1976 when Congress passed, following furious debating, 
maneuvering, and infighting, the HSR Act.75  President Ford reluctantly signed 
the HSR Act into law on September 30, 1976,76 although he attempted to mask 
his reluctance by saying that he was “pleased to see [the bill] enacted into 
law.”77 
The HSR Act is designed to provide the federal antitrust enforcement 
agencies “with the opportunity to review competitively-relevant information 
about large mergers and acquisitions—and to seek to enjoin or remedy them 
if, in the agency’s view, they would create or enhance market power or 
                                                          
73  Section 7 of the original 1914 Clayton Act prevented companies from acquiring 
the stock of rival companies where “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially 
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”  Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 
Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731–32.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act was 
designed to prevent economic concentrations through acquisition in their incipiency.  
See United States v. United Machinery Shoe Co., 264 F. 138, 162 (E.D. Mo. 1920), 
aff’d, 258 U.S. 451 (1921).  Unfortunately, companies frequently used asset purchases 
to completely evade the Act’s objectives.  See, e.g., Arrow-Hart Hegemen Elec. Co. 
v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 291 U.S. 587, 595 (1934); Lande, supra note 40, at 130. 
74  Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, Pub L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (amending 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 to state in part: “No person engaged in 
Commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire . . . the whole or any 
part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity 
affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting 
commerce in any section of the county, the effect of such acquisition may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”)  Congress passed 
the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act to close the Clayton Act’s asset purchase loophole, and 
to further broaden the Clayton Act to help stem what it perceived to be a “rising tide 
of economic concentration in the American economy.”  Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States, 370 U.S. 294, 315–23 (1962).  The Brown Shoe Court emphasized that Section 
7 of the Clayton Act is to be applied to mergers and acquisitions where the “trend to a 
lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency.”  Id. at 317; 
see also Derek Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and 
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 305–07 (1960) (discussing the “set of value 
premises” that drove the Celler-Kefauver Act; and observing that “none of the 
justifications for mergers by big companies were accorded any significance by 
Congress”); Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Pursuit of 
Economic ‘Objectivity’: Is There Any Role for Social and Political Values in Merger 
Policy?, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 273–74 (1985); Lande, supra note 40, at 137–
40; Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 766, 
779–80 (1952).  
75  Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 
201, 90 Stat. 1390 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012)). 
76  Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976: Statement by the 
President on Signing H.R. 8532 Into Law, Sept. 30, 1976, 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 40, 1423 (Oct. 4, 1976) [hereinafter Presidential Statement of Sept. 30, 1976]. 
77  Id. at 1424.  
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facilitate its exercise—before the merger or acquisition occurs.”78  Under Title 
II’s premerger notification provision, companies with the requisite respective 
net assets or annual sales are required to notify the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice 
(DOJ) before merging.79  
Once the proper premerger notification papers are filed, the FTC and the 
DOJ have 30 days to decide whether to ask for more information or to allow 
the merger or acquisition to proceed.80  If the government quickly decides that 
there are no competitive problems with the acquisition, it can grant “early 
termination,” and allow the merger to proceed before the 30 days have 
passed.81  Conversely, if the government believes there may be a competitive 
problem, it can issue a “Second Request” requiring the parties to submit 
additional information.82  The government’s Second Request stops the clock, 
and stays the proposed acquisition while the parties gather the information 
necessary to respond.83  “Requests for additional information . . . generally 
include both interrogatories and requests to produce documents, and are often 
far-reaching in their scope.”84 
After the parties have fully responded to the government’s Second 
Request, the government has an additional 30 days to decide whether to allow 
                                                          
78  ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 356 (8th 
ed. 2017).  “The HSR Act requires the parties to notify the DOJ and the FTC before 
consummating the proposed transaction and to observe the applicable waiting period.  
Notification requirements are triggered by ‘size-of-person’ and ‘size-transaction’ tests, 
so smaller transactions do not trigger HSR filing requirements.”  ABA SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST LAW, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST 
ISSUES 13 (4th ed. 2015).  The FTC has issued implementing regulations and forms 
that can be found in the Federal Register and the FTC’s website.  See, e.g., Premerger 
Notification Program, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program 
[https://perma.cc/EWU4-ANA4] (last visited Feb. 2, 2018); see also 18 U.S.C § 18a 
(2012) (Premerger notification and waiting period).  For an excellent discussion of the 
Act’s requirements, see ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 78, at 
405–13.  
79  See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (“Filing.”).  The precise jurisdictional requirements 
include: 1) a commerce test; 2) a size-of-the-parties test; and 3) a size-of-the-
transaction test.  Id.  
80  Id. § 18a(b) (“Waiting period.”).  
81  Id. § 18a(b)(2).  The waiting time for cash tender offers is only 15 days.  Id. § 
18(b)(1).  
82  Id. § 18a(e)(1)–(2). 
83  Id. (“Additional information; waiting period extensions.”). 
84  S. AXINN ET AL., ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST 
IMPROVEMENTS ACT: A PRACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE AND REGULATIONS § 
1.03(2)(a)(i) (rev. ed., 2003) [hereinafter “AXINN ET AL.”]. 
2018  REDISCOVERING ANTITRUST’S LOST VALUES 199 
 
the acquisition to proceed unchallenged.85  If the government decides, 
however, that the effect of the proposed acquisition “may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,” the government may file 
a motion for a preliminary injunction blocking the acquisition in a “United 
States district court for the judicial district within which the respondent resides 
or carries on business.”86 
 
1. The Legislative History of the HSR Act 
 
President Ford’s simple statement on September 30, 1976, that he was 
“pleased to see [the HSR Act] enacted into law,”87 and the Judiciary 
Committee’s straightforward Statement of Interest, masked a furious 
legislative battle and heavy Administration infighting against the bill that 
caused the final bill to be substantially changed and “watered down” from its 
early iterations.88  Describing the intense and sometimes bitter legislative 
debates, Senator Edward Kennedy observed on September 8, 1976, that 
“[p]erhaps only the tax reform bill has been the subject of such extensive 
committee and floor consideration as this legislation.”89 
Consistent attempts to reform the Clayton Act by requiring companies to 
notify the government before they merged had been going on since at least 
1938.90  Thus, bills requiring advance notifications were introduced in 1938, 
1943, and 1946, “but never came to a vote in either the House or Senate.”91  
Additional reform attempts suffered similar fates due to intense opposition 
from business interests in 1956, 1961, and 1967.92  
Finally, in March 1975, Senator Phillip Hart of Michigan, a progressive 
protégé of Senator Estes Kefauver, made it one of his final missions to see 
meaningful antitrust reforms enacted.  As Chairman of the Antitrust and 
                                                          
85  15 U.S.C. § 18a(e); 16 C.F.R. §§ 803.10, 803.20 (2017).  In the case of cash 
tender offers, the additional waiting period is only ten days.  Furthermore, in the case 
of tender offers, only compliance by the acquiring party, as opposed to both parties, is 
required to restart the waiting period.  15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(2).  
86  15 U.S.C § 18; id. § 18a(f) (“Preliminary injunctions; hearings.”). 
87  Presidential Statement of Sept. 30, 1976, supra note 76, at 1424.  
88  Senator Abourezk, a leading supporter of the bill, noted that in June of 1976, 
he had been “opposed to any kind of compromise.  But due to the illness of Senator 
Philip A. Hart [cancer], who was no longer physically able to keep up with the pace at 
that time—because this is Senator Hart’s bill . . .—a number of us who were involved 
in the legislation then agreed to go ahead with the weakening process.”  122 CONG. 
REC. 28,569 (1976).  Senator Gary Hart of Colorado similarly observed, “I will vote 
for H.R. 8532 despite the fact that I am disappointed at the compromises which had to 
be made during its consideration in the Senate.”  Id. at 29,163.  
89  Id. at 29,334. 
90  See AXINN ET AL., supra note 84, § 2.02. 
91  Id. 
92  Id.  
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Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, he 
introduced, in March 1975, Senate Bill 1284, a seven-title omnibus antitrust 
reform package.93  It was well known that Senator Hart was suffering with 
terminal cancer, which gave his hard-fought battle for passage of his Bill a 
special poignancy and inspired the Bill’s proponents.94  Nevertheless, Senator 
Hart’s Bill faced hostile and intense opposition over the next 18 months, and 
could not have been passed without substantial compromises and reductions 
in the Bill’s scope, including the elimination of four of its original titles.95 
From the time that Senator Hart introduced his premerger notification Title 
in the Senate, and hearings began in the Antitrust Subcommittee in May 1975, 
the opposition from the Ford Administration and leading conservative 
Republicans, such as Senator Hruska of Nebraska and Senator Thurmond of 
South Carolina, was spirited.96  The opponents made sure that numerous 
leading voices of the business community were permitted to appear and 
express “their strong opposition to the entire concept of preacquisition 
notification and to the specific provisions of Title V.”97 
Although the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee ultimately favorably 
reported Title V to the full Senate by a vote of ten to five,98 the Minority Views, 
                                                          
93  Id.  The premerger notification requirements were contained in Title V of the 
original bill.  Other Titles included a Declaration of Policy (Title I); Antitrust Civil 
Process Act amendments (Title II); Federal Trade Commission Act amendments (Title 
III); parens patriae amendments (Title IV); a section affecting nolo contendere (“no 
contest”) pleas in Clayton Act cases (Title VI); and various amendments, including an 
expanding of Section 7 of the Clayton Act’s jurisdiction (Title VII).  See id. at n.14. 
94  See Senator Philip A. Hart Dies at 64; Was Called ‘Conscience of Senate’, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 27, 1976), http://www.nytimes.com/1976/12/27/archives/senator-philip-
a-hart-dies-at-64-was-called-conscience-of-senate.html [https://perma.cc/U3XX-
JATV] (“Mr. Hart . . . did not seek re‐election in 1976 because he was suffering from 
cancer.”). 
95  In the final Bill, Title 1 “expand[ed] the civil investigating powers of the 
Antitrust Division.”  Presidential Statement of Sept. 30, 1976, supra note 76, at 1424.  
Title II covered premerger notification, and Title III “permit[ted] State attorneys 
general to bring antitrust suits on behalf of the citizens of their States to recover treble 
damages.”  Id.  President Ford noted his strong opposition to Title III of the final Bill, 
but nevertheless signed the Bill in part because “[t]o meet in part my objection, 
Congress wisely incorporated a proviso which permits a State to prevent the 
applicability of [Title III].”  Id. 
96  At one point, Senator Kennedy opined that with respect to the rights of the 
majority in the Senate, the minority was engaging in an “abuse of those rights.” 122 
CONG. REC. 16,939 (1976). 
97  AXINN ET AL., supra note 84, § 2.03(1); see also The Antitrust Improvements 
Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 1284 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of 
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 151–201, 217–38 (1975) (testimony and 
proposed statements of J. W. Riehm and J. Randolph Wilson for the Chamber of 
Commerce of the U.S. and Richard D. Godown, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.) 
98  122 CONG. REC. 7,570 (daily ed. May 19, 1976). 
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which were printed on May 20, 1976, were caustic and angry.99  As an 
example, the Minority Report began by asserting, “Title V would give the 
Government arbitrary fiat powers to prevent any business acquisition, 
regardless of size or competitive impact, and runs counter to basic antitrust 
policies by inhibiting the competitive, efficient formation and allocation of 
capital resources.”100   Such heated opposition continued up to the Bill’s final 
passage.  For instance, on September 7, 1976, Senator Thurmond stated: 
 
I shall vote against this bill with good reasons. . . . It will add 
more money to the already bulging pockets of the antitrust 
lawyers.  It puts more big brotherism in Government.  If fails 
to achieve balance.  It does not require the big unions to follow 
the antitrust laws that the proponents thrust on business.  It 
will hurt the small businessman.  It will hurt the consumer.101 
 
Although such intensive opposition did not ultimately block passage of the 
Bill, it led to numerous compromises, including reducing the initial stay period 
from 60 to 30 days;102 putting the burden of proof on the government in any 
preliminary injunction proceeding, and requiring the government to get a stay 
from a United States District Court if it wanted to challenge the transaction 
after the final 20-day post-Second Request period expired.103  As Senator 
Edward Kennedy, a leading proponent, summarized on August 31, 1976: 
 
[T]his whole issue, had been considered in subcommittee with 
5 days of hearings, in full committee with 3 days of hearings 
and a total record of over 2,000 pages, with weeks of markup 
sessions in committee spanning up to 16 hours, with extensive 
debate on the floor of the Senate covering 10 days and some 
70 votes. . . . We have compromised and compromised and 
compromised . . . .104 
 
One week later, Senator Kennedy added: 
                                                          
99  S. REP. NO. 94-803 (1976) (report of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary together 
with Minority Views) [hereinafter “Senate Minority Report”]. 
100  Id. at 205.  
101  122 CONG. REC. 29,155 (1976).  
102  See id. at 16,479–81 (debating Senate Amendment No. 1747 to change initial 
waiting period from 60 to 30 days). 
103  See id. at 16,916 (testimony by FTC and DOJ officials stating that the 
Administration did not support an “automatic stay” provision).  The Senate killed the 
proposed automatic stay provision on June 10, 1976.  Id. at 17,427.  
104  Id. at 28,570.  
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Enough is enough, we have compromised the bill down and 
down, severely narrowing or even eliminating substantial 
portions of the original S. 1284.  What remains may not be the 
best possible bill, but it is a good one.  It will help bring better 
enforcement of the antitrust laws.  It will be a solid step in the 
right direction.105 
 
2. The Political Context of the HSR Act 
 
Political, economic, and institutional factors were especially critical in 
influencing the ultimate passage and scope of HSR Title II’s premerger 
notification requirements.   
 
a. Political Factors 
President Ford originally opposed much of Senator Hart’s seven-title 
omnibus antitrust reform Bill, as against the interests of the business 
community, but indicated a willingness to support limited aspects of the Bill.  
By early 1976, it was becoming clear that President Ford would face a tough 
reelection battle in November 1976.  For example, the Ford Administration 
found itself facing escalating criticism from Democrats over “the quality of 
the administration’s antitrust enforcement.”106  President Ford had to balance 
such concerns against his fear that he might be defeated in the Republican 
primary by the pro-business conservative Ronald Reagan.  On April 4, 1976, 
the Ford Administration found itself under heavy Washington Post criticism 
in an editorial entitled Waffling on Antitrust Laws.107  The editorial began:  
 
President Ford is getting himself into needless trouble over 
the antitrust legislation now moving through Congress.  It’s 
sadly reminiscent of the way he got himself into trouble over 
the common situs picketing bill.  In each case the 
administration strongly committed itself to the legislation.  
Then some months later, after assiduous lobbying by 
businessmen, Mr. Ford began to think of reasons for backing 
away from it. . . . [T]he legislation is fortunately, very much 
alive and the President may decide to think again and sign it.  
                                                          
105  Id. at 29,335.  
106  See, e.g., Editorial, The Antitrust Bill, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 1976, reprinted in 
122 CONG. REC. 15,958 (1976). The Post noted “the ferocious opposition mounted by 
a wide variety of businesses” to antitrust reform, and questioned why “[a]s for the 
premerger notification rule, there has been, unaccountably, no action at all” in the 
House Judiciary Committee. Id.  
107  Editorial, Waffling on Antitrust Laws, WASH. POST, April 4, 1976, reprinted in 
122 CONG. REC. 15,957 (1976).  
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But the stakes are large and the outcome is very much in 
doubt.108 
 
The editorial concluded, “Mr. Ford seems to find all the pressures of the 
Republican primary elections pushing against a broader enforcement of the 
antitrust laws.  But he might discover, on further reflection, that they actually 
ought to be pushing the other way.”109 
Ultimately, once President Ford defeated Governor Reagan in the 
Republican primary and found himself facing the populist Jimmy Carter of 
Georgia, he grudgingly accepted the recommendations of his political advisors 
to sign the final Bill.110  Perhaps to protect his pro-business flanks, President 
Ford expressed ambivalence in signing the HSR Act on September 30, 1976: 
 
I believe that far too many important managerial decisions are 
made today not by the marketplace responding to the forces 
of supply and demand, but by the bureaucrat.  Government 
regulation is not an effective substitute for vigorous 
competition in the American marketplace.111 
 
The impact of the esteemed Senator Hart’s courageous battle against 
terminal cancer throughout the debates of 1975 and 1976 cannot be 
overemphasized in setting the context for the willingness of Senators on both 
sides of the aisle to reach compromises that would allow him to achieve his 
final mission, granting him an appropriate send-off.  Eulogizing Senator Hart 
several months before the final Senate vote on Senate Bill 1284, Senator 
Kennedy poignantly observed: 
 
Senator Hart assumed the chairmanship of the Antitrust 
Subcommittee almost 13 years ago when antitrust was far 
from “in vogue.” . . . It is indeed fitting and proper that—as 
                                                          
108  Id.  
109  Id.  
110  “Press reports indicated that the Justice Department, the office of Management 
and Budget, and Ford’s political advisors recommended that he sign the bill, while the 
Treasury Department, the Small Business Administration, and Attorney General 
Edward Levi (in a private communication to President Ford inconsistent with the 
official recommendation of his agency) recommended that he veto it.”  Joe Sims & 
Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino Merger 
Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust 
Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 876 n.44 (1997) (citing Carole Shifrin, Levi 
Recommended Veto of Antitrust Bill, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1976, at C10; see also 5 
DAILY EXEC. REP. (BNA), Sept. 29, 1976, at A-23-24).  
111 Presidential Statement of Sept. 
30, 1976, supra note 76, at 1423.   
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Senator Hart concludes this term in the Senate—we should be 
tagged the “Antitrust Congress.”112 
 
The HSR Act’s supporters also showed great perspicacity in bundling into 
the final Bill antitrust civil process reform, which the Ford Administration 
desired, to make the overall Bill more palatable to its opponents.  This 
bundling allowed President Ford to crow, as he signed the final Bill, “[t]hese 
amendments to the Antitrust Civil Process Act were proposed by my 
administration two years ago, and I am pleased to see that the Congress has 
finally passed them.”113 
 
b. Economic and Institutional Factors Surrounding the HSR Act 
Changing macroeconomic factors were crucial to setting the context for 
the debates over the HSR Act.  These included the ongoing transition from a 
domestic to an increasingly international economy, the continuing 
development of “allocative efficiency” theories at the University of Chicago 
and other conservative institutions, and increasing inflation. 
As the economy shifted throughout the 1970s toward increasing 
internationalization and globalization, many businesspersons came to believe 
that American corporations would have to get bigger and stronger to 
successfully compete in the global marketplace.  Senator Fannin of Arizona 
cogently summarized the rationale behind Republican opposition to any 
domestic governmental restraints on mergers and acquisitions by complaining 
that American companies could not fairly compete with merged companies 
from such countries as Germany, Japan, and France.114  Aligned against this 
                                                          
112  122 CONG. REC. 17,559 (1976). 
113  Presidential Statement of September 30, 1976, supra note 76, at 1424.  
114  122 CONG. REC. 16,936 (1976).  Senator Fannin stated:  
  
Mr. President, we have many reasons to try to assist in the 
formation of capital today.  I have mentioned the great need in the 
energy industry because I do feel that this is something that is very 
close to home to all of us here in Congress.  We are daily trying to 
get greater development of these energy resources.  But it takes a 
tremendous amount of capital formation, and what we are doing, if 
this title V is adopted, is going contrary to the work that is being done 
in so many committees. 
 
It is my feeling that we must be competitive in our industries, not 
only within our country but as far as the competitive position we 
should be in with other countries of the world.  We find ourselves 
lacking in that ability many times because of our inability to join our 
companies together to bring about an operation that can compete.  We 
are in competition with countries such as Japan, West Germany, and 
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“bigger is better” philosophy stood progressives such as Senators Hart, 
Kennedy, and Abourezk, who believed that America could only remain strong 
through continuing economic innovation and rigorous domestic competition, 
which would be best provided by a diverse array of smaller and more 
aggressive competitors.115  
Conservative senators such as Jacob Javits further expressed concerns that 
overly zealous enforcement of the antitrust laws was discouraging “the 
investment of private capital of the United States and other developed 
countries in the developing countries.”116  Senator Javits felt this revealed “a 
deep conflict between our antitrust philosophy and other major national 
policies when there should be coordination and thoughtful accommodation 
between them.”117  Senator Javits additionally observed that many experts had 
concluded that “uncertainty about the enforcement of U.S. antitrust law 
extraterritorially [was] the greatest single inhibitor to increased foreign trade 
and investment.”118  Senator Kennedy quickly and ably sought to address such 
concerns by citing to letters from the American Life Insurance Association, 
which stated, “[w]e are satisfied that . . . title V does not adversely affect the 
capital markets,” and “title V would not adversely affect the investment 
programs of mutual funds in the capital markets.”119 
Ultimately, the developing philosophical values battle between those 
favoring economic concentration and efficiency, and the proponents of 
economic diversity and opportunity, also played a major role in the HSR Act 
debates.  According to antitrust commentators Joe Sims and Deborah 
Herman120: 
 
By 1976, economic efficiency was increasingly elbowing 
“big is bad” out of its position as the principal framework for 
                                                          
France, countries that do not have all those restrictions that we have.  
In fact, in Japan, for instance, they have their government going hand 
in glove with their industries to see that they are in a position to 
compete in the other countries of the world.  In fact, we have many 
reasons to be very jealous of what they are doing because it is 




115  See id. at 15,310–14, 17,559. 
116  Id. at 16,712.  
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. at 16,937. 
120  Both Sims and Herman served as Deputy Assistant Attorneys General for 
Antitrust in Republican administrations. Sims served under President Ford, and 
Herman in the Bush II Administration.  Herman also later served as the Chairman of 
the FTC.  Sims & Herman, supra note 110, at 865 n.3, 865–66. 
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antitrust analysis.  The Supreme Court was starting to reflect 
this new learning in nonmerger cases like Sylvania, and even 
to some extent in merger cases like General Dynamics and 
Marine Bancorporation.  The old antitrust was clearly losing 
steam.121 
 
Such developing neoconservative economic thinking undergirded the 
opponents’ arguments that the “so-called ‘merger problem’ [was] a myth,” and 
that the Act “contradict[ed] fundamental antitrust principles favoring fluid 
resource mobility in free and competitive markets.”122  The Act’s opponents 
cited to a June 8, 1976 editorial in the Phoenix, Arizona Republic morning 
newspaper lambasting “Marxian principles,” and argued that “the fundamental 
process that has been eroding our liberties is the politicization of economic 
decisions . . . .”123 
Countering this developing neoconservative economic doctrine was the 
idea that big indeed often is bad.  Senator Abourezk blasted the “realities of 
the concentration of economic power.”124  He explained that although there 
were over 40,000 manufacturing corporations in the United States in 1976, 
“the 200 largest control two-thirds of all manufacturing assets.  That’s a greater 
share of assets than the thousand largest manufacturing corporations controlled 
in 1941.”125  Senator Abourezk was further troubled that “[i]ndustries in which 
four or fewer firms control 50 percent or more of sales account for one-fourth 
to one-third of all manufacturing sales,” and that “[w]e now have five 
corporations whose sales exceed the total budget of our most populous state, 
California.”126 
A third macroeconomic context in the HSR debate, as the Presidential 
election of 1976 approached, was the economic ravages caused by rising 
inflation.  Proponents of the Bill contended that by helping to control 
monopolies, the Bill would control inflation.  As an example, Senator 
Abourezk argued on May 25, 1976, “I firmly believe that this concentration of 
economic power is one of the root causes of the country’s present economic 
difficulties.  This concentration of power is the structural cause of our 
simultaneous inflation and depression.”127  Echoing this strong rhetoric, the 
Washington Post editorialized on September 16, 1976, “[s]tronger antitrust 
enforcement is a weapon against inflation.  The bill deserves the votes of those 
                                                          
121  Sims & Herman, supra note 110, at 872.  
122  Senate Minority Report, supra note 99, at 212.  
123  122 CONG. REC. 16,936 (1976) (quotations omitted) (citing Editorial, Antitrust 
Government, Ariz. Republic, June 8, 1976).  
124  Id. at 15,313. 
125  Id. at 15,313–14. 
126  Id. at 15,314. 
127  Id. 
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congressmen who believe in open markets and greater competition in the 
American economy.”128 
In response, Senator Thurmond argued that unfettered private enterprise 
was the best way to fight inflation.  He asked:  
 
How are we going to increase employment if we do not have 
business growth, if we do not expand the economy and 
provide more jobs . . . ?  [P]rivate enterprise will provide most 
of the jobs for our people if we will unshackle private 
enterprise and quit loading it down with more and more 
regulations and harassing it, as is now being done, by so many 
agencies of this Government . . . .129 
 
Finally, institutional factors affecting the Courts and the Executive 
branch’s antitrust regulatory agencies (the FTC and the DOJ’s Antitrust 
Division) also played a key role in catalyzing the passage of the HSR Act.  
“The poster child in the legislative debate was the tortured litigation history of 
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.”130  As noted in the legislative 
history, “the litigation spawned by the El Paso Natural Gas merger lasted 
seventeen years, and went to the Supreme Court six times, before the illegally-
acquired firm was successfully divested.  But the costs—to the firms, the 
courts, and the marketplace—were immense.”131  The House Judiciary 
Committee concluded: 
 
To avoid the worst of these protracted exercises in futility 
is the major purpose of this bill.  Merger litigation simply need 
not always continue for years and even decades—but if it 
takes place after consummation, it generally will, for the 
acquiring firm has no incentive to litigate the issues speedily.   
 
In contrast, pre-consummation merger litigation proceeds 
rapidly and expeditiously, because all parties have a 
paramount interest in the quick resolution of the case. 
 
In sum, the chief virtue of this bill is that its provisions 
will help to eliminate endless post-merger proceedings like 
                                                          
128  Editorial, Penalties for Price Fixing, WASH. POST., Sept. 16, 1976, reprinted in 
122 CONG. REC. 30,644 (1976).  
129  122 CONG. REC. 15,322 (1976).  
130  William J. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement Under 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 825, 826–27 (1997) (discussing United 
States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964)).  
131  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, at 10 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637, 
2642.  
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the El Paso and Papercraft cases, and replace them with far 
more expeditious and effective premerger proceedings.  It can 
be done, and the savings will be considerable, as the AMAX 
case indicates.132 
 
Ultimately, the HSR Act was a quintessential piece of “top down” 
legislation.  Leaders from the worlds of business, law, and economics, as well 
as members of the administration, dominated the hearings. Trade associations 
and consumer welfare associations such as the Consumer Federation of 
America, which claimed to represent more than 30 million “consumers,” also 
appeared.133  Ironically, while both sides claimed to represent the “public 
interest,” there was very little record of any public participation other than a 
few letters placed in the Congressional Record, which upon close inspection, 
appear to be form letters prepared by elite business or consumer 
organizations.134  It seems fair to assert that the public, who were most directly 
affected by economic concentration, had to hope that their interests were truly 
aligned with those of the participating elites.  
 
3. The Underlying Values Assumptions and Premises of the HSR Act’s 
Proponents and Opponents 
 
a. Proponents’ Underlying Assumptions for the Bill 
As described above, the first key economic assumption held by the 
proponents of premerger notification was that the increasing consolidation of 
American industry was dangerous.  Senator Abourezk and other proponents of 
the HSR Act staunchly believed that too much economic concentration was 
inherently dangerous.  Senator Abourezk noted that: “The rapid trend toward 
consolidation is illustrated by the fact that between 1962 and 1968 alone, 110 
of the 500 largest industrial firms disappeared in mergers.  Between 1948 and 
1968, some 1,200 manufacturing companies, each with assets of $10 million 
or more, were merged with other firms.”135  Similarly, Senator Kennedy 
pointed to a 1966 study chaired by Senator Phillip Hart warning that there was 
“a frightening amount of concentration of power in a few corporate hands, 
[and] that this had dangerous implications for our social and political, as well 
as our economic, welfare.”136  Senator Kennedy further lamented “the almost 
daily newspaper stories on how these giant corporations have taken this power 
                                                          
132  Id.  
133  See, e.g., Letter of Consumer Federation of America (Aug. 2, 1976), reprinted 
in 122 CONG. REC. 25,056 (1976).  
134  See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 15,322–24 (1976) (citing a number of letters from 
businessmen addressed to Senator Thurmond). 
135  Id. at 15,314.  
136  Id. at 17,559.  
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and used it to corrupt and illegally influence governments and to destroy many 
of our traditional values . . . .”137 
Premerger notification opponents attacked this economic assumption as 
the “conjur[ing] up [of] a non-existent ‘merger problem.’”  In their Senate 
Minority Subcommittee Report of May 20, 1976, they claimed “[t]he assertion 
that the alleged ‘concentrated structure of American industry . . . in major part 
stems from mergers and acquisitions’ is not only unsupported by the record, 
but is contrary to fact.”138 
A corollary to the HSR Act’s proponents’ assumption that economic 
consolidation was increasing was a growing belief that the resultant corporate 
power was increasingly undeserved.  In introducing Senate Bill 1284 to the 
Senate on March 21, 1975, Senator Hart observed in part: 
 
[C]urrently $1 out of every $4 consumers spend goes to buy 
products produced by a concentrated industry.  Much of this 
concentration developed not from hardnose competition but 
from gobbling up a competitor rather than going out and 
establishing new competition.139 
 
A second key assumption of the proponents of premerger notification was 
that absent such notification, many illegal mergers would occur before the 
government had a realistic chance to challenge them.140  Several commentators 
have challenged this assumption.  For example, Sims and Herman “[did] not 
find it plausible that any truly significant transaction [would] escape detection 
in these days of intense media scrutiny and strategic complaints by 
competitors.”141  The HSR Act’s opponents also argued that “[s]ince 1969 an 
FTC program [had effectively] required premerger notification of proposed 
mergers involving large companies.”142 
Finally, the HSR Act’s proponents believed that the Bill ultimately would 
apply only to “the very largest corporate mergers—about the 150 largest out 
                                                          
137  Id. 
138  Senate Minority Report, supra note 99, at 215. 
139  121 CONG. REC. 8,143 (1975).  
140  See 122 CONG. REC. 14,711 (1976) (quoting Congressman Peter W. Rodino’s 
assumption that “if this bill’s premerger notification and waiting requirements are 
enacted into law, the Government will have a fair and realistic chance to challenge 
illegal mergers before they occur”); 122 CONG. REC. 15,310 et seq. (“[W]hat is even 
more troublesome, the Department may not investigate mergers under the Antitrust 
Civil Process Act until after the transaction has taken place.  After an illegal merger 
has taken place, securing adequate relief is extremely difficult.  Once the eggs of the 
two companies have been scrambled, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to pull 
them apart.”). 
141  Sims & Herman, supra note 110, at 892.  
142  Senate Minority Report, supra note 99, at 216.  
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of the thousands that take place every year.”143  This assumption was 
challenged by the Act’s opponents, who argued that “Title V’s premerger 
notification provisions are unjustifiably broad, reaching too many transactions 
and delaying them too long.”144  Hindsight reveals that thousands of mergers 
and acquisitions annually fall within the ambit of the HSR Act’s premerger 
notification requirements, although the vast majority are quickly and 
expeditiously cleared.145 
 
b. Opponents’ Assumptions Against the Bill 
A primary assumption of the HSR Act’s opponents was that the legislation 
and attendant rules would reach too many inconsequential transactions and 
impose unnecessary costs, burdens, and delays on business.  One commentator 
opined in 1979, shortly after the final accompanying rules were promulgated, 
that “regulation writers descended upon the scene, like a swarm of locusts.”146  
Opponents branded the Bill’s requirements as “unrealistic,” and argued that it 
“cover[ed] far more than ‘giant companies.’”147   
A second major assumption was that the Act’s requirements would 
“inhibit[] the competitive, efficient formation and allocation of capital 
resources.”148  Senator Buckley contended that his constituents in the 
investment community in New York feared “that the implications of this 
legislation of Title V [would] be to dramatically curtail the ability of people to 
move from one investment to another and all that this has meant down through 
the years to permit our system of capital formation and mobility of capital to 
perform its wonders.”149  The correctness of this assumption is called into 
serious question by the tens of thousands of acquisitions and mergers that have 
proceeded without challenge since the Act’s passage in 1976.  For example, in 
2002, the FTC challenged only 24 transactions, and the Antitrust Division only 
                                                          
143  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, at 11, (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637, 
2643.  
144  Senate Minority Report, supra note 99, at 210.  
145  See FED. TRADE COMM’N AND ANTITRUST DIV., ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002: PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION (J) OF SECTION 7A OF 
THE CLAYTON ACT—HSR ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1976 (TWENTY-FIFTH 
REPORT) 1 (2002), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/25th-report-fy-
2002/hsrannualreport_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4NT-MYX8] [hereinafter ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR, 2002]; see also Richard W. Pogue, Effects 
on Other Merger Transactions: Does the Government Abuse its Newly Granted 
Power?, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1471, 1473–75 (1979).  
146  Pogue, supra note 145, at 1471.  
147  Senate Minority Report, supra note 99, at 210.  
148  See id. at 205.  
149  122 CONG. REC. 16,928 (1976).  
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10.  Moreover, a number of the challenged transactions were allowed to 
proceed following limited divestitures of assets by the merging parties.150 
 
4. The Clash of Values in the HSR Debates 
 
In debating whether the public would be better served by the HSR Act’s 
premerger notification requirements, each side sought to invoke cherished 
American values.  For example, the Act’s proponents invoked such values as 
equal opportunity through increased competition, equality before the law, 
diversity (less concentration increases dynamic efficiencies and innovation), 
fairness, and accumulation of wealth deservedly through “hard-nosed 
competition” rather than “gobbling up competitors.”  
Opponents of premerger notification countered by invoking the values of 
freedom of the marketplace, due process, efficiency (“bigger is better”), and 
competition through neo-Darwinian philosophies of “survival of the fittest.”  
As seen, these are essentially the same values that were argued and debated 
prior to the passage of the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts.  Set forth below 
is a comparison of the conflicting economic, moral, social, and political values 
invoked by the proponents and opponents of the HSR Act.  
                                                          
150  See ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR, 2002, supra note 145, 
at 1–2.  
 
   
Value Type Proponents Opponents 
Economic Competitive 
Relations  








Freedom/“Survival of the 
Fittest” 
 
Social Equality before the 
law 
Equal Opportunity  
Due Process 
Freedom of Contract 
 




Responsive to crisis 
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Ultimately, the HSR legislative debates continued to pit fundamental 
American values like protecting economic diversity, opportunity, and fairness 
against such countervailing values as economic freedom, private property 
rights, and efficiency through concentration.  Throughout the HSR Act’s 
legislative process, Congress sought to balance and blend the proponents’ and 
opponents’ conflicting social, political, moral, and economic values to forge a 
workable set of legislative compromises.  Although the HSR Act’s proponents 
urged Congress to accept and adopt the neoconservative economic values 
being espoused in 1976 by Robert Bork and other Chicago School 
neoconservatives, Congress declined to do so.  Congress instead chose to enact 
antitrust legislation designed to encourage and enhance America’s economic 
strength through aggressive governmental oversight of mergers and 
acquisitions and rigorous enforcement of the Clayton Act.  Although some 
neoconservative commentators have branded the HSR Act as “in many ways . 
. . the last gasp of the old antitrust,”151 the HSR Act has served the test of time, 
and is an invaluable asset in America’s ongoing antitrust merger and 
acquisition enforcement. 
 
C. American Values and the National Cooperative Production Amendments 
of 1993 and 2004 to the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 
 
In 1993, after four years of spirited Congressional hearings and debates, 
President Clinton signed the National Cooperative Production Amendments of 
1993,152 thereby creating the NCRPA.153  Congress originally passed the 
NCRA in 1984 to “help ensure that fear of antitrust liability would not unduly 
discourage firms from forming R&D [research and development] joint 
ventures.”154  The 1993 Amendments expanded the NCRA to include 
production joint ventures, and the 2004 Amendments further expanded the 
NCRPA to include standards-setting organizations.155  “With respect to 
production and research joint ventures, the NCRPA provides that such a ‘joint 
venture’ will not be illegal per se, but will ‘be judged on the basis of its 
reasonableness, taking into account all relevant factors affecting 
competition.’”156  In passing the NCRPA, President Clinton worked closely 
                                                          
151  See, e.g., Sims & Herman, supra note 110, at 876.  
152  National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, § 
3(b), (c), 107 Stat. 117, 118 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306 (2012)).  
153  15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306.  
154  ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 78, at 468.  
155  See id. at 469; 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (applying rule of reason to joint ventures and 
standard-setting organizations).  Congress set forth the purposes of its 1993 NCRA 
Amendments as helping “to promote innovation, facilitate trade, and strengthen the 
competitiveness of the United States in world markets . . . .”  107 Stat. at 119. 
156  ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 78, at 469 (citing 15 U.S.C. 
§ 4302).  Congress later amended the NCRPA again in 2004 to cover voluntary 
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with moderate Democrats and Republicans in Congress, as well as domestic 
business interests, to create a “real bipartisan coalition to make America work 
again, to help our business and our working people to move forward in the 
global economy.”157  
 
1. Legislative History of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 
 
In 1984, Congress sought to address potential concerns and perceptions 
that the prospect of antitrust challenges was partially responsible for the 
reluctance of competitive firms in the United States to undertake joint research 
and development (R&D) activities.158  The Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust, the Honorable J. Paul McGrath, testified in hearings before the 
Senate that: 
 
The antitrust problem in the area of joint R&D is this 
perception—I should say misperception—that the antitrust 
laws constitute a barrier to joint R&D.  The perception 
translates into a business risk—the risk that after substantial 
investments are made in joint R&D, the venture participants 
may be threatened by unfounded antitrust challenges . . . .159 
 
Congress sought to allay such concerns through the NCRA, which 
expressly allowed competitors to engage in approved joint R&D activities 
without having to fear the prospect of potential treble antitrust damages.160  
Congress concluded that such legislation was necessary to stimulate “the 
                                                          
standards development organizations, as well as research and production joint 
ventures.  See Development and Promulgation of Voluntary Consensus Standards, 
Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (2004) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–
4305).  
157  Remarks of President Clinton on signing the National Cooperative Production 
Amendments of 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC., NO. 23, 1059 (June 10, 1993) 
[hereinafter 1993 Presidential Remarks]. 
158  S. REP. NO. 98-427, at 2–3 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105, 
3107. 
159  Id. at 3, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3107.  Business executives 
echoed such testimony.  For example, Steven Olson, Associate General Counsel of 
Control Data Corporation, testified in part that: “I think it fair to say that even among 
those who believe that our antitrust laws do not—or at least under reasonable 
application should not—inhibit cooperation in R&D, there is general agreement that 
many business executives perceive such laws as significant barriers to joint research.  
They thus shy away from such activities—and, over the long haul, our country is the 
loser.”  Id.  
160  See 15 U.S.C. § 4303.  
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international competitiveness of U.S. firms in both mature and emerging 
industries.”161 
Opponents of the 1984 NCRA legislation as originally proposed, tried, but 
were unable to delete key provisions awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing 
defendants in antitrust suits challenging joint R&D activities, and eliminating 
a “94-year tradition of treble damages for proven violations of the antitrust 
laws.”162  Criticizing President Reagan’s overall dramatic rollback of antitrust 
                                                          
161  S. REP. NO. 98-427, at 1, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3105.  The 
Report submitted by the Senate Judiciary Committee, then headed by Senator Strom 
Thurmond (R-S.C.) explained:  
  
The international competitiveness of U.S. firms in both mature 
and emerging industries depends on their ability to remain at the 
frontiers of technological development.  Equally important, the 
security of the United States vitally depends on the ability of U.S. 
firms to maintain their technological edge.  Research and 
development is critical to the success of those efforts.  
 
In many industries, however, the research and development 
necessary to remain competitive has become increasingly costly and 
risky—indeed, often prohibitively so.  In addition, limits on the 
available pool of skilled scientific and technical personnel may 
preclude any single company from gathering the talent needed to 
make an R&D project successful.  
 
In recent years, many of our trading partners have recognized the 
need for collaborative R&D efforts.  Having seen the potential for 
tremendous economies that could be achieved through such efforts, 
firms in other countries have formed numerous joint R&D projects, 
often with government encouragement.  
 
Many U.S. firms have also recognized the potential value of joint 
R&D efforts.  These firms recognize that joint R&D holds the 
promise of a more efficient use of both scarce R&D capital and 
human resources.  In light of the increasing competitiveness of the 
world economy, joint R&D efforts also represent a necessary step to 
continued prominence of U.S. firms.  Furthermore, stepped-up joint 
R&D activity, and the innovation that it will make possible, 
promises to increase productivity and employment, and to permit 
continued American leadership in important fields of research. 
 
Id. at 1–2, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105, 3105–06. 
162  See id. at 32 as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3126 (statement of Senator 
Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)).  Interestingly, Senator Metzenbaum mistakenly tied 
treble damages to the Sherman Act of 1890, when in fact they were created by the 
Clayton Act of 1914 (thereby creating only a 70-year tradition of treble damages for 
proven violations of the antitrust laws). 
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enforcement, Senator Metzenbaum, the former chair of the Judiciary 
Committee, argued: 
 
The current administration’s lax enforcement of the antitrust 
laws demonstrate[d] that now, more than ever, we need 
private antitrust enforcement.  By eliminating the treble 
damages incentive in difficult antitrust litigation, we may be 
effectively immunizing such conduct.  The elimination of 
treble damages will have a very adverse effect on the ability 
of those injured by violations committed by joint ventures—
typically small businesses—to vindicate their claim.163 
 
Senator Metzenbaum and others also questioned the need for the NCRA, 
since “the principal administration official who pushed this legislation, former 
Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter, has publicly conceded that ‘the 
extent to which the antitrust laws interfere with research and development is 
vastly overrated.’”164 
Through its passage of the NCRA in 1984, Congress showed that it 
understood and was not afraid to exercise its power to limit the potential 
breadth of its original antitrust laws.  Importantly, however, Congress did so 
without adopting wholesale the neoconservative economic values currently in 
vogue.  Instead, as with the HSR Act of 1976, Congress sought to carefully 
balance and blend conflicting fundamental political, social, and economic 
issues in an attempt to create a limited and workable legislative compromise 
that would promote general American welfare.  
 
2. The Legislative History of the 1993 NCRPA 
 
President Clinton enthusiastically signed the 1993 National Cooperative 
Production Amendments on June 10, 1993 in a White House ceremony, where 
he praised the “real bipartisan coalition” that “worked so hard to make this bill 
a reality and the leadership of both the House and the Senate.”165  Three weeks 
earlier, on May 18, 1993, the House Judiciary Committee published an 
extensive report praising the bill as “economically beneficial and conducive to 
a resurgence of U.S. leadership in high technology.”166  Congress set out three 
basic findings: 
 
(a) technological innovation and its profitable 
commercialization are critical components of the ability of the 
                                                          
163  Id. at 34, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3128. 
164  Id. at 33, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3128. 
165  1993 Presidential Remarks, supra note 157, at 1058–59. 
166  H.R. REP. NO. 103-94, at 16 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 176, 
189. 
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United States to raise the living standards of Americans and 
to compete in world markets; 
 
(b) cooperative arrangements among nonaffiliated businesses 
in the private sector are often essential for successful 
technological innovation; and 
 
(c) the antitrust laws may have been mistakenly perceived to 
inhibit procompetitive cooperative innovation arrangements, 
and so clarification serves a useful purpose in helping to 
promote such arrangements.167 
 
Congress sought to justify the new amendments by painting a dire picture 
of America’s declining competitiveness in the global marketplace.168 
The House Judiciary Committee also extensively focused on increasing 
criticism from Chicago School economists and business interests singling out 
America’s antitrust laws “as a deterrent to innovative activity.”169  The 
Committee cast an envious eye upon how “in Europe, and most particularly in 
Japan, the formation of so-called ‘depression’ and ‘rationalization’ cartels has 
become an important aspect of industrial policy.”170  Nevertheless, to ease the 
                                                          
167  National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 
107 Stat. 117, 117 (1993). 
168  H.R. REP. NO. 103-94, at 8, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 180.  The 
House Judiciary Committee worryingly observed: 
 
At the beginning of the 101st Congress, a number of developments 
in several vital high-technology industries brought to the fore the 
issue of the antitrust treatment of production joint ventures.  The last 
decade had witnessed a number of problems in economic and 
educational performance that all seemed to point to a condition of 
flagging U.S. international competitiveness: there was documented 
evidence of the continued dismal educational performance in math 
and science by American school children, a massive erosion of 
domestic market share in industries ranging from telephones and 
semiconductors to televisions and ball bearings, a serious 
deterioration in the high-technology trade balance, and a decreasing 
importance of American inventions in the patent system.  
 
Id. 
169  Id. at 9, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 181. 
170  Id. at 9–10, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 182. The House Judiciary 
Committee emphasized: 
 
The fundamental question presented by production joint venture 
legislation has ultimately to do with the relationship between the 
antitrust laws and innovation. The Committee is sympathetic to the 
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concerns of the legislation’s diverse critics, the Committee stressed its 
substantial desire and objective to not override the thrust of the antitrust laws 
in blocking collusive and anticompetitive agreements between competitors.171  
President Clinton’s upbeat and optimistic remarks on June 10, 1993, as he 
signed the National Cooperative Production Amendments into law, presented 
a “non-controversial façade” that masked spirited legislative hearings and 
debates that had delayed the legislation’s passage for four years.172  President 
Clinton exuberantly proclaimed that “by clarifying and eliminating 
misapprehensions about antitrust risk, this legislation will allow joint ventures 
that can increase efficiency, facilitate entry into markets, and create new 
productive capacity that otherwise would simply not be achieved.”173  Yet, in 
reality, the Amendments’ opponents succeeded in substantially watering down 
the bill—thereby continuing some of the legal uncertainty surrounding 
production joint ventures.174  Moreover, congressional recognition of 
nationalistic and xenophobic concerns seriously limited the ability of domestic 
                                                          
desire to enhance collaborative activity in order to spur American 
competitiveness, but not at the expense of those provisions of the 
antitrust laws that are in place to ensure that smaller economic 
players have the ability to redress antitrust injury resulting from the 
exploitation of market power advantage.   
 
In some quarters, a new theory appears to be developing which 
holds that cooperation between firms engaged in industries subject 
to rapid technological change cannot possibly injure competition, 
because of the diversity of sources of innovation and the new nature 
of global competition.  Yet, at this point in time, that theory—though 
obviously the product of thoughtful analysis—nevertheless remains 
an economic hypothesis, and not a statement of empirically 
demonstrated fact. 
 
Id. at 16, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 189.  
171  See id. (“Consequently, H.R. 1313, as the NCRA before it, seeks to clarify this 
favorable view of cooperative ventures without making unwarranted substantive 
changes in the fabric of the antitrust laws.”). 
172  See ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 181 (1973). 
173  1993 Presidential Remarks, supra note 157, at 1058. 
174  As an example, Congress stated that the Amendment “create[s] no exemption 
to the antitrust laws; nor does it change existing legal standards . . . . Nor does 
compliance with the reporting procedures relieve any person of the notification 
obligations under Hart-Scott-Rodino, 15 U.S.C. 18a.”  H.R. REP NO. 103-94 at 5, as 
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 177.  Critics like Drake McKenney, an international 
antitrust lawyer, concluded that “[u]nfortunately the definition of ‘joint venture,’ when 
read in conjunction with the list of activities that are excluded from the definition of 
joint venture pursuant to the new law, is far from a model of clarity.”  See Drake D. 
McKenney, New Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J., 
46, 47, 49 n.2. (Sept./Oct. 1994).  
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companies to take advantage of the Act by partnering with foreign 
corporations.175  In effect, Congress’s and President Clinton’s desire to create 
a broad bipartisan consensus “allow[ed] [the] legislators to avoid confronting 
difficult questions.”176 
As background, following the NCRA’s passage in 1984, its proponents 
were greatly disappointed by how few American companies seemed to be 
taking advantage of its provisions.  For example, in 1989, Congressman Tom 
Campbell (R-Ca) reported that “[w]hereas we have had roughly 30 filings a 
year under the National Cooperative Research Act, Europe under their block 
exemption from antitrust for the cooperative activity is running at over 300 per 
year.”177  As anxiety increased over America’s perceived drop in global 
economic competitiveness, Chicago School economic theorists and business 
interests began pushing to greatly expand NCRA.178 
Beginning in 1989, in the 101st Congress, a series of proposed legislation 
was introduced seeking to expand domestic joint venture opportunities.  
Different approaches included: 1) “extend[ing] existing procedures and 
protections of the NCRA to cooperative activity beyond the research and 
development stage” (House Bill 1025; House Bill 2264; House Bill 423);179 2) 
taking a “certification” approach that “would have established a substantive 
antitrust safe harbor when the parties to a joint venture lack market power in 
the relevant product market” (House Bill 1024); and 3) “a project-specific bill 
(House Bill 2287) . . . that would have established under the direction of the 
Secretary of Commerce, an industry-led consortium for research and 
production of high definition television systems.”180 
                                                          
175  See Derek Devgun, Crossborder Joint Ventures: A Survey of International 
Antitrust Considerations, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 681, 713 (1996).  Reviewing 
Section 4306, Mr. Devgun observed “that Congress intended the 1993 amendments to 
inure to the benefit of the U.S. economy, regardless of the nationalities of the parties 
to the venture.”  Id. 
176  STEVEN M. GILLON, THAT’S NOT WHAT WE MEANT TO DO: REFORM AND ITS 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 238 (2000). 
177  Production Joint Ventures Antitrust Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 423, H.R. 
1024, H.R. 1025, and H.R. 2264  Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial Law 
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 51 (1989) [hereinafter House 
Subcommittee Hearings] (statement of Hon. Tom Campbell (R-Cal.)). 
178  In opening the hearings on May 17, 1989, Chairman Jack Brooks observed that 
“[t]he media has given recent coverage to the concern that America is losing the all-
important technological race in the areas of high definition television, supercomputers, 
and superconductivity.  Industry and Government spokesmen now urge that American 
companies be allowed to form consortia to better compete.”  Id. at 1. 
179  H.R. REP. NO. 103-94, at 6, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 178.  H.R. 
423 “would have limited the NCRA protections only to small companies (less than 
500 employees).”  Id. 
180  Id. at 6.  
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Extensive hearings and debates ensued, and over the next four years, the 
legislation slowly evolved into its ultimate form through protracted 
subcommittee proceedings that included substantial mark-ups and introduction 
of new bills.  Throughout this arduous legislative process, Congress expressed 
concerns over the White House’s perceived lack of interest and involvement.  
For example, on July 26, 1989, Chairman Brooks admonished Secretary of 
Commerce Robert A. Mosbacher: 
 
[W]e’re still waiting.  When do you think the proposal 
will be submitted to us?  
 
 . . . .  
 
You can understand, before we reach a decision in the 
Committee, we would like to have some indication really of 
where you’re coming from on this issue . . . . We may not 
agree with you fully but we will have an idea of where we can 
go.   
 
Nobody wants to dig into one of these issues when we 
don’t have some basis of accord with the White House.  This 
kind of issue is so important.181 
 
President Clinton’s and Vice President Gore’s personal and substantial 
involvement in support of the legislation in early 1993 ultimately turned the 
tide in the proponents’ favor.182  However, the lengthy congressional 
proceedings, which spanned three separate Congresses (the 101st through the 
103rd), galvanized the opponents, and enabled them to firmly stamp their 
imprints upon the final bill.183  Thus, Arthur Kaplan, a plaintiff’s antitrust 
                                                          
181  House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 157 (statement of Hon. Jack 
Brooks). 
182  See THE CRISIS AND RENEWAL OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM: A CIVILIZATIONAL 
APPROACH TO MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 186 (Laurence Cossu-
Beaumont et al. eds. 2016) (discussing President Clinton’s efforts to build a more 
coherent, competitive competition policy through such means as increased R&D joint 
ventures and collaborations). 
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attorney from Philadelphia, who testified aggressively against the Bill on 
September 28, 1989, was able to testify on March 18, 1993, in support of the 
ultimate Bill.184  Kaplan was pleased that the Bill was “explicitly limited to 
joint production facilities in the United States, generating jobs here in the 
United States,”  and felt the final Bill struck “a reasonable balance and 
correct[ed] misperceptions about the antitrust laws.”185  Chairman Brooks 
similarly noted on March 18, 1993, that the ultimate Bill “represent[ed] a 
significant improvement over those measures previously introduced in this 
Committee,” and lauded such a “bipartisan agreement.”186  He added, “it 
reflects not only today’s economic realities but also a determination, on both 
sides of the aisle, to take effective steps to meet that challenge.”187 
During the Presidency of George W. Bush, Congress further expanded the 
scope of the NCRPA in 2004 to extend to “standards development 
organization[s] while engaged in a standards development activity.”188  
Congress noted that: 
 
Standard development organizations play a pivotal role in 
promoting free market competition.  Technical standards 
promote product competition by ensuring a common interface 
between products that may be substituted for one another.189 
 
Congress was impressed in part by the arguments of economist David 
Teece that “[c]ompatibility standards are essential if products and their 







[https://perma.cc/PWE7-8GFG] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018) (outlining the discussions 
of the NCRA throughout the 101st-103rd Congresses). 
184  House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 424 (statement of Arthur 
Kaplan); National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 
1313 Before the Subcomm. On Econ. and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 45 (1993) [hereinafter House Subcommittee Hearings II] 
(statement of Arthur Kaplan). 
185  House Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 184, at 43, 44–45 (statement of 
Arthur Kaplan). 
186  Id. at 17–18 (statement of Hon. Jack Brooks). 
187  Id. 
188  See 15 U.S.C. § 4302(2); 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(7). 
189  H.R. REP. NO. 108-125, at 3 (2004), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 642, 
643. 
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complements are to be used in a system.”190  As with the NCRPA of 1993, the 
2004 Amendments expressly excluded such activities as “[e]xchanging 
information among competitors relating to cost, sales, profitability, prices, 
marketing, or distribution of any product, process, or service that is not 
reasonably required for the purpose of developing or promulgating a voluntary 
consensus standard . . . .”191 
 
3. The Political, Economic, and Ideological Context of the NCRPA 
 
Political, economic, technical, and ideological factors all played critical 
roles between 1989 and 1993, in shaping and influencing the scope of the 
NCRPA as enacted in June, 1993, and subsequently amended in 2004.  
 
a. Political Factors 
Neither President H.W. Bush nor his Administration ever got behind the 
proposals to amend the NCRA in any meaningful way.  A possible explanation 
may be that the Administration was concerned about opposition to the 
legislation by entrepreneurs such as Dr. T.J. Rodgers, the President and CEO 
of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation in San Jose, California, and George 
Gilder, a conservative Republican author.192  Another possibility is that the 
Administration was unable or unwilling to choose sides among the numerous 
competing interest groups.  
In any event, once President Clinton came to power, the efforts to amend 
the NCRA took off.  President Clinton’s support was largely due to his desire 
in early 1993 to be perceived as a friend to business while he got the sluggish 
economy moving.193  President Clinton saw the legislation as: 
 
                                                          
190  Id. at 3 (citing David J. Teece, Information Sharing, Innovation and Antitrust, 
62 ANTITRUST L.J. 465, 475 (1994)).  
191  15 U.S.C. § 4301(c)(1)–(3); see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-125, at 9, as reprinted 
in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 649–50.  
192  Interestingly, James F. Rill, who served as the Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust under Bush I, never testified concerning the legislation during his tenure at 
Justice.  However, in March 1993, shortly after President Clinton assumed office, Mr. 
Rill was invited to appear as a featured speaker in favor of the legislation.  See House 
Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 184, at 23–33 (statement of James Rill).  Mr. 
Rill testified that “of the various approaches that have been suggested in this area, a 
straightforward extension of the NCRA to joint production ventures is the best option.”  
Id. at 29. 
193  The Clinton campaign’s focus on the economy was made popular by campaign 
advisor James Carville’s infamous phrase “It’s the economy, stupid!”  THE WAR 
ROOM (Cyclone Films et al., 1993).  The phrase is memorialized in the notorious 
documentary The War Room, which followed the campaign in the New Hampshire 
primaries.  Id. 
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[T]he embodiment of the concept that the Vice President 
and I strongly espoused during our campaign last year.  It will 
allow American companies, large and small, to pool their 
resources to compete and win in the international 
marketplace.  
 
. . . . 
 
This is an example of how you can have a real bipartisan 
coalition to make America work again, to help our business 
and our working people to move forward in the global 
economy.194 
 
Perhaps even more importantly, President Clinton was looking forward to 
recommending a dramatic series of health care reforms.  A key component of 
such reforms was expected to include “[t]he formation of large regional 
alliances which would buy health care insurance for individuals and small 
businesses. . . . [And] at the same time, . . . encourage greater cooperation 
among health care providers.”195  Thus, President Clinton saw his visible and 
successful support for the National Cooperative Production Amendments as a 
crucial first step in priming the pump for future antitrust reforms related to 
health care.  
In early 1993, with the American economy sagging, and a new President 
in office largely as a result of economic frustrations, Congress felt tremendous 
pressure to be perceived as aggressively supporting technological innovation 
and American competitiveness.  As Chairman Brooks noted in his opening 
statement on March 18, 1993, “[a]fter two Congresses of contemplating 
possible legislation in this area, I think it is high time we act on this bill if we 
are going to do our part in bolstering American competitiveness.”196  Praising 
the bipartisan nature of the legislation, Chairman Brooks expressed his 
agreement with President Clinton’s view of the legislation as “just the kind of 
forward-thinking initiative we need to drive the economy toward a decade of 
creative change.”197 
 
b. Economic Factors 
 
Similar to the passage of the HSR Act, changing macroeconomic factors 
                                                          
194  1993 Presidential Remarks, supra note 157, at 1058–59. 
195  Thomas A. Piraino Jr., Reconciling Competition and Cooperation: A New 
Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 871, 875 (1994) 
(footnotes omitted).  
196  House Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 184, at 1 (statement of Hon. Jack 
Brooks). 
197  Id. at 2 (statement of Hon. Jack Brooks) (quoting President Bill Clinton). 
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were crucial to setting the context for the debates over the National 
Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993.  These included the ongoing 
transition from a domestic to an increasingly globalized economy, and the 
continued development of neoconservative Chicago School economic 
theories.  Economists such as Milton Friedman were finding receptive 
audiences for their criticisms of “[t]he over-estimation of the importance of 
monopoly”198 and their recommendations that government “let [people] follow 
the bent of their own interests because there is no way of predicting where they 
will come out.”199 
Contemporaneous with Congress’s consideration of the legislation, the 
media were focusing upon the developing economic thinking that effective 
global competition requires access to substantial amounts or resources 
procured through cooperative efforts.  For example, on February 17, 1993, the 
New York Times praised a joint venture between Cummins Engine Company 
and Komatsu Limited of Japan, as another in the growing “list of huge 
multinationals pooling their resources to manufacture existing products and 
develop new ones.”200  Similarly, on April 13, 1993, the Wall Street Journal 
reported approvingly on a series of ten collaborative research and development 
activities between the “Big Three” American automakers.201  Also receiving 
substantial media attention, as the legislation moved towards final passage, 
was a series of global telecommunications and network alliances.202  Picking 
up on such media reports, Representative Carlos J. Moorhead submitted a 
formal statement advocating joint venture legislation that would result in 
“more efficient use of capital, the development of new products for the 
American consumer, and the creation of new jobs for American workers.”203 
Also critically important to the passage of the Amendments was the 
economic perception in early 1993 that the Japanese and Europeans were 
gaining ground, and even beating America in the new global economy.  
Representative of such thinking was the testimony in March 1993 of Pat 
                                                          
198  See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 123 (rev. ed., 2002).  
199  Id. at 118.  
200  Barnaby J. Feder, Two Diesel Giants Set Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1993, 
at D1.  The article added that the diesel engine production joint venture “comes at a 
time when the pace of industrial cooperation is accelerating both domestically and 
across borders.” Id. at D5.  
201  Oscar Survis, Big Three Win Joint Patent, Making a First, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
13, 1993, at B1.  
202  Mary Lu Carnevale et al., U.S. West Move Puts Pressure on Its Rivals, WALL 
ST. J., May 18, 1993, at B1; AT&T Plans to Establish Global Information System, 
WALL ST. J., May 26, 1993, at B6; John J. Keller & Mary Lu Carnevale, MCI and BT 
Set a Counterstrike Against AT&T, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1993, at A3; Stephen K. Yoder 
& G. Pascal Zachary, Digital Media Business Takes Form as a Battle of Complex 
Alliances, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1993, at A1. 
203  House Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 184, at 19 (statement of Hon. 
Carlos J. Moorhead).  
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Choate, an economist and former vice president for policy analysis at TRW, 
and a director of the Manufacturing Policy Project.204  Additional economic 
concerns included America’s growing trade deficits, and the loss of 
manufacturing jobs as the domestic manufacturing base shifted from 
“smokestack” to hi-tech industries.205 
 
c. Ideological Factors 
As Milton Friedman observed, “[i]n the economic area, a major problem 
arises in respect of the conflict between freedom to combine and freedom to 
compete.”206  By the late 1980s, the American courts and regulatory agencies 
                                                          
204  Mr. Choate argued:  
 
When one takes a look at American industry and the global 
economy, we have to find the ways and means to make American 
industry swift and strong.  
 
Now, one of the reasons that the country’s industries have not 
been able to compete is they lack some of the options that other 
industries in other countries have to work together.  I think H.R. 
1313 cuts out some underbrush that is hampering American industry 
today.   
 
The second thing that is very clear is that American industry 
today is facing competition that is organized in a very different way 
in Europe and in Japan and Korea than in the United States.  These 
industries operate, as this committee has studied before, in giant 
keiretsus that have banks that stand in the center, and these banks 
are backed by their governments.  They literally cannot go bankrupt.  
These are competitors who cannot go bankrupt.  
 
. . . . 
 
Now, I am an economist and not a lawyer, but reading H.R. 1313 
through an economist’s eyes, I think it does some things that need 
to be done in this economy.  It permits our companies to come and 
work together.  It allows them to do it with greater assurances of no 
frivolous lawsuits, primarily private lawsuits.  
 
Id. at 39.  In his written comments, Mr. Choate pessimistically added that “global 
competition for American entrepreneurs and firms is a bet your company gamble.  And 
we are losing.”  Id. at 41.  
205  See, e.g., House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 163 (statement of 
Chairman Jack Brooks “that the trade is moving steadily to the Eastern rim.”) 
206  FRIEDMAN, supra note 198, at 26.  
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had dramatically shifted from favoring the freedom to compete207 over the 
freedom to combine, to favoring more competitor combinations and 
collaborations under the guise of increasing allocative efficiencies.208 
Equally important from the legislation’s opponents’ perspective was the 
countervailing economic idea that “free and open competition” was the key to 
long-term American economic competitiveness.209  San Francisco plaintiffs’ 
antitrust attorney (and former San Francisco mayor) Joe Alioto argued, 
“there’s absolutely no question that something like 8 to 9 out of 10 of the new 
products are developed by smaller companies and that 8 out of 10 of the jobs 
are created by smaller companies.”210  Mr. Alioto concluded that “[e]veryone 
should have the right to compete and all of our markets should be free, open 
and unfettered.  There should be no fixes.”211 
Throughout the legislative debates, ideologies and viewpoints relating to 
the economic impacts of global technological competition were fiercely 
debated.  For example, Representative Boucher (R-Va) observed that 
                                                          
207  For example, in 1984, economists David Teese and Thomas Jorde criticized the 
earlier prevailing view that “no cooperation should be permitted, that it is best we keep 
companies apart from one another.”  Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teese, Innovation, 
Cooperation, and Antitrust, 4 HIGH TECH L.J. 1, 12, 18 n.43 (1989).  Professor Jorde, 
from University of California, Berkeley, testified in favor of the National Cooperative 
Production Amendments on July 26, 1989.  House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 
177, at 221 (statement of Professor Thomas Jorde).  Professor Jorde noted that “[t]he 
need for business cooperation and the drag the current antitrust law places upon that 
cooperation is a subject that I have been studying now for a number of years with my 
colleague, David Teese, of the University of California.”  Id. at 222.  
208  See, e.g., Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985).  
Judge Easterbrook wrote:  
 
Cooperation is the basis of productivity.  It is necessary for people 
to cooperate in some respects before they may compete in others, 
and cooperation facilitates efficient production . . . . The war of all 
against all is not a good model for any economy.  Antitrust law is 
designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and 
competition, not to require all economic actors to compete full tilt at 
every moment. 
 
Id. at 188 (citations omitted).  
209  House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 203, 219 (statement of Dr. 
T.J. Rodgers of Cypress Semiconductor Corp.).  Dr. Rodgers argued, “I don’t think 
we have to give up the American entrepreneurial system to Japanese-like controls in 
the United States.  I think the solution is education.  Give us more engineers.  We’ll 
go off and fight with the Japanese.”  Id. 
210  Id. at 260.  
211  Id. at 258.  Mr. Alioto added that “the antitrust laws are our Magna Carta of 
free enterprise . . . They are as important to our economic freedom as the Bill of Rights 
is to our personal freedom.”  Id. at 256.  
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“technically oriented industries are characterized today by increasingly short 
product life cycles, by continuous modification of products as experience 
suggests new areas for improvements, and rapid response to consumer demand 
both for variety and customization . . . .”212  Contemporary media reports 
similarly focused on the purported success of competitive alliances in 
developing new technologies and cutting-edge innovations.213  The need for 
accumulated capital to conduct expensive R&D and bring innovations to 
market successfully also was paramount.214 
 
4. The Underlying Values and Ideological Premises of the Proponents and 
Opponents of the NCRPA 
 
a. Proponents’ Assumptions for the Bill 
 
A major assumption driving the Bill’s proponents was that the Japanese 
and the Europeans were winning the long-term economic battle for control of 
the globalized marketplace due to their government-sanctioned cooperative 
efforts.  By 1993, Japan was being referred to as “Japan, Inc.,” and authors like 
Michael Crichton were writing sinister novels about Japan’s economic 
conquest of the western world.215  In the words of Pat Choate, “we are 
losing.”216  Ironically, as Japan’s economy crashed in the mid-1990s, the 
Japanese began questioning the effectiveness of their Keiretsus (business 
                                                          
212  House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 48 (statement of Rep. 
Boucher). 
213  See, e.g., Stephen E. Almassy & E.B. Baatz, 455 Electronics Execs Say Rugged 
Individualism is Fading, reprinted in ERNST & YOUNG, PROGRESSION OF AN 
INDUSTRY: ELECTRONICS 92: STRATEGIC ALLIANCE OUTLOOK (1992).  
214  See, e.g., House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 55.  Representative 
Tom Campbell (R-Ca.) noted: 
 
Many of the cutting-edge industries for international competition 
require massive amounts of capital . . . . This high specific capital 
cost takes many of these investments beyond the scope of single 
American firms.  The joint venture, or consortium, provides an 
appealing alternative.  Capital costs are shared; market risks are 
diversified.  
 
Id. at 55–56. 
215  See generally MICHAEL CRICHTON, RISING SUN (1992) (unraveling a fictitious 
murder-mystery whilst providing a skeptical commentary of Japanese-American 
economic relations).   
216  House Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 184, at 41.  
2018  REDISCOVERING ANTITRUST’S LOST VALUES 227 
 
networks) and ultimately implemented more comprehensive and tougher 
competition laws.217   
The second major assumption held by the proponents was that a fear of 
antitrust liability had chilled the formation of efficient procompetitive 
production joint ventures.  Representative Thomas Campbell, who had 
formerly served as the director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of 
Competition, presented the specter of “per se treatment” in arguing that far 
more production joint ventures would exist in a more hospitable legal 
environment.218 
As early as 1984, during the hearing on the NCRA, Senator Metzenbaum 
and others had questioned such assumptions.  They pointed to the paucity of 
historical antitrust challenges to research joint ventures and the absence of 
“hard evidence to support the claim that elimination of treble damages will 
encourage significantly more joint ventures.”219  Representative Synar 
observed that:  “First, there are several examples of joint ventures already 
formed, operating and successful under the antitrust laws.  Second, the 
Antitrust Division . . . has never challenged a joint venture with an allegation 
of per se antitrust illegality.  And third, it is difficult to believe that any 
negative perception exists even under this [lax] Antitrust Division.”220  The 
opponents’ criticisms appear to have been justified.  Since 1993, relatively few 
companies have chosen to avail themselves of the Act’s notification 
provisions, and not a single legal case interpreting or applying the Act appears 
today in Title 15 of the United States Code Annotated.221  
 
b. Opponents’ Assumptions Against the Bill 
A primary assumption of the legislation’s opponents was that the 
durability of America’s antitrust laws has helped protect America’s long-term 
economic prospects.  George R. Heaton, an industrial economist at MIT, stated 
in 1989, “[t]o me, the fact of 100 years [of American antitrust laws] suggest 
                                                          
217  A series of studies examining all of Japan’s government-sanctioned cartels 
from 1953 to 1994 “found virtually no cartels in Japan’s highly successful industries, 
while cartelized industries such as petrochemicals, chemical fertilizers, textiles and 
cement were largely unsuccessful internationally.”  Michael E. Porter & Mariko 
Sakakibara, Competition in Japan, 18 J. ECON. PERSPS., 27, 40 (Winter 2004).  
218  House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 53. 
219  S. REP. NO. 98-427, at 33 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105, 
3127. 
220  House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 43, 269 (statement of Rep. 
Synar) (“Since [May], there has been nothing presented to change my mind.”); see 
also id. at 393 (statement of Rep. Coelho) (“I don’t believe that an antitrust law change 
will help facilitate what they’re trying to do.”). 
221  See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4301–4306 (West 2009 & Supp. 2017) (citing no cases that 
analyze the disclosure requirements). 
228    UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 16, No. 2 
 
[sic] a differing starting assumption, and that is, conservatism.  The durability 
of antitrust law coupled with its relative resistance to change reflect, in my 
view, a well-considered wisdom of the American people.”222   
A second key assumption of the opponents was that “wide open 
competitiveness,” rather than competitor collaborations, creates the best 
chances for inventing new technologies.  Dr. T.J. Rodgers of Cypress 
Semiconductor Corporation pointed to the success of Intel in developing the 
dynamic RAM, but then losing its “position as the American leader in that 
market to Micron Technology, an entrepreneurial start-up in Boise, Idaho.  
Intel also invented the static RAM, a faster memory used in high-performance 
computers, only to abandon that market to Cypress, and our arch rival, 
Integrated Device Technology.”223  Dr. Rodgers asserted that “[i]f the antitrust 
laws had been relaxed a few years ago at the expense of these start-ups who 
held their ground in the memory market, the Japanese would have been 
virtually 100% successful in wiping out our semiconductor memory 
industry.”224 
Finally, the opponents assumed that the Bill’s attempts to discriminate in 
favor of American companies would “hurt American competitiveness” by 
depressing the level of foreign investment in the United States.225  This 
assumption has been effectively rebutted by the continuing staggering level of 
foreign investment in the United States, which helps support our escalating 
budget deficits.226   
 
5. Conflicting Values in the NCRPA Debates 
 
In debating the merits of the National Cooperative Production 
Amendments of 1993, both sides agreed upon the desired economic outcome: 
enhanced American global competitiveness through greater scientific 
advancements and technological innovations, and increased domestic 
productivity.  Yet they differed dramatically in the role Congress and 
government regulation should play in helping to achieve such objectives.  In 
debating whether to allow increased cooperation and collaboration between 
                                                          
222  House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 88. 
223  Id. at 198. 
224  Id.   
225  See Letter of Robert Umphrey, Chairman, Investment Committee, Organization 
for International Investment (an association “of more than 50 U.S. companies 
representing a broad cross-section of the manufacturing and services sections”) to 
Hon. Jack Brooks (Mar. 17, 1993), reprinted in the Appendix to House Subcommittee 
hearings II, supra note 184.  
226  See generally MARC LABONTE AND JARED C. NAGEL, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, FOREIGN HOLDINGS OF FEDERAL DEBT (Mar. 28, 2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22331.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ2D-7GWM].   
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competitive businesses, each side invoked their own set of cherished and 
historical American values.  A powerful tension existed between the 
proponents’ belief in increased cooperation, collaboration, and efficiency, and 
the opponents’ belief in competition and diversity.  For example, the 
proponents lauded the potential efficiency gains from increased cooperation 
and collaboration, and the fairness to businesses of greater legal and regulatory 
certainty.  The opponents countered that open and unfettered competition 
between a diverse group of entrepreneurial small businesses would allow the 
economic cream to rise to the top, and spur innovation and technological 
advances.  
Set forth below is a comparison of the conflicting economic, moral, social, 
and political values that drove the debates and the ultimate legislative 
compromises.  
 

















Social Due Process 
Legal Certainty 
 




Political Spontaneous Cooperation 
Government Support of 
Business (Government as a 
Partner) 
Anticipation of Crisis 








Responsive to Crisis 




Similar to earlier legislative debates concerning American antitrust 
legislation, core American political, social, and economic values had to be 
balanced and blended to achieve working legislative majorities.  The four years 
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of hearings leading to the NCRPA mirrored the earlier debates over the 1976 
HSR Act.  The core American values of competition, diversity, and fairness 
held by progressive thinkers such as Louis Brandeis, Teddy Roosevelt, and 
Howard Metzenbaum ran headlong into the competing values of 
concentration, collaboration, efficiency, and economic freedom held by free-
market conservatives such as Milton Friedman, Ronald Reagan, and Strom 
Thurmond.   
A unique confluence of political factors, including President Clinton’s 
recent election based primarily upon widespread economic anxiety, enabled 
the NCRPA’s opponents and proponents to craft a series of compromises that 
generated widespread bipartisan support for the legislation.  Bipartisan support 
was further solidified by focusing upon the shared values of increased 
American economic competitiveness through scientific advancement and 
technological innovation, and the generally shared assumption that greater 
protections from the antitrust laws would catalyze the formation of a myriad 
of new production joint ventures.227  Perhaps most importantly, between 1984 
and 2003, Congress never adopted wholesale neoconservatives’ economic 
philosophies or values, and instead passed and amended legislation designed 
to create carefully circumscribed and limited exceptions to aggressive 
enforcement of the Sherman Act.  As it had done in passing the HSR Act in 
1976, Congress made it clear that it was not prepared to abandon or discount 
the diverse political, social, and moral goals underlying our early antitrust 
laws.  
 
III. CONGRESS’S HISTORICAL BALANCING AND BLENDING OF DIVERSE 
FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL, POLITICAL, MORAL, AND ECONOMIC 
VALUES AND OBJECTIVES IN AMERICA’S ANTITRUST LAWS 
 
The antitrust legislative histories and impressive scholarship discussed in 
                                                          
227 As discussed, President Clinton announced the 1993 NCRPA Amendments with 
great fanfare, and Congress then passed the 2004 Amendments with little discussion 
or opposition.  This showed that following extensive legislative debates in 1984 and 
1993, the legislation was no longer seen as controversial during the Bush II years.  
Nevertheless, the initial extensive opposition and heated values debates ultimately 
resulted in a substantial watering down of the proponents’ original objectives.  
Ultimately, the ongoing debates and congressional review had the positive unintended 
consequence of catalyzing the promulgation seven years later by the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission of extensive, meaningful, and useful 
Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors.  These Guidelines serve 
today as a material source of legal guidance for competitive companies seeking to 
enter into joint ventures.  See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE AND FTC ANTITRUST 
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Part II confirm that Congress has never sought to codify through our antitrust 
laws a single economic philosophy or ideology such as Chicago 
neoconservative economics.228  Neither has Congress sought to promote a 
single neoconservative economic objective such as maximizing consumer 
welfare or allocative efficiency.229  Rather, Congress has sought to balance 
various communal and market values with the goal of promoting America’s 
economic and political welfare while safeguarding and protecting cherished 
historical American values including equality of opportunity, economic 
diversity, divided economic and political power, and economic ethics, 
morality, and fairness.230  
For more than 100 years, Congress has approached antitrust with the 
political understanding that it must balance and blend a diverse array of social, 
political, moral, and economic objectives.  In so doing, Congress has 
recognized that the relevant social, political, moral, and economic concerns 
underlying our antitrust laws are “more than menacing neighbors.”231  Rather, 
they are “interdependent and mutually defining” sets of societal values and 
visions that must be balanced and blended if our antitrust laws are to be 
                                                          
228  See, e.g., PERITZ, supra note 63, at 26 (discussing how “the common-law 
Sherman Act, with its supplement of uncommon-law remedies, seemed to be reaching 
for a middle ground between the rhetorics of industrial liberty and fair price, between 
their logics of competition policy and private property rights, and between their statist 
and libertarian approaches.”); Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than 
Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1191 
(1977); HOFSTADTER II, supra note 26, at 199–200 (discussing Congress’s economic, 
social, and political goals); Stucke II, supra note 27, at 2578 (discussing how 
competition policy “has had, and will always have, multiple, economic, political, 
social, and moral objectives”). 
229  Stucke I, supra note 1, at 599; see also THORELLI, supra note 26, at 165 
(discussing how the Sherman Act sought to balance “the conflict between some of the 
most ingrained ideas of the American people of the nature and workings of [our] 
political economy”); Fox, supra note 13, at 578 (discussing Clayton Act’s diverse 
economic goals); Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1051-60 (discussing antitrust’s key 
political goals); Horton IV, supra note 12, at 632–34 (discussing Congress’s concern 
with protecting competitive opportunities); Andreas Koutsoudakis, Antitrust More 
Than a Century After Sherman: Why Protecting Competitors Promotes Competition 
More Than Economically-Efficient Mergers, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 223, 230 (2009) 
(“[P]rotecting competitors is one main purpose for which Congress enacted antitrust 
legislation . . . .”). 
230  See generally Daniel Yankelovich, How Changes in the Economy Are 
Reshaping American Values, in VALUES IN PUBLIC POLICY 16, 23 (H. J. Aaron et al. 
eds., 1994) (discussing the importance of such “unchanged values” as equality of 
opportunity, fairness, and freedom); id. at 43 (discussing the “conflict Americans feel 
between what might be called ‘market values’ versus ‘communal values’”); id. at 44 
(arguing that even in harsh economic times, “Americans care deeply about reconciling 
communal with market values”). 
231  PERITZ, supra note 63, at 303. 
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workable, effective, and supported by both the business community and the 
American public.232 
When Congress passed such core antitrust legislation as the Sherman Act 
in 1890, and the Clayton and FTC Acts in 1914, it was fully cognizant of and 
wished to push forward the broad social, political, moral, and economic 
currents favoring equality of opportunity, fair and ethical competition, and the 
fear of concentrated power—both political and economic.  These core 
American values predated the American Revolution, and sparked the Boston 
Tea Party on December 16, 1773—a revolt against the British East India 
Company’s efforts to monopolize the colonial tea trade.233 
Such fundamental values and concerns continued to mold Americans’ 
thinking in the early years of our Republic.234  For example, on September 18, 
1833, President Andrew Jackson stated that American citizens’ freedoms were 
at risk “from combinations of the wealthy and professional classes,” whose 
wealth was too often “insidiously employed.”235  President Abraham Lincoln 
                                                          
232  Id.  Professor Peritz believes that the blending of such values through 
congressional bargaining and negotiation represents our antitrust laws’ strength.  He 
explains: 
 
Such treatment of economic and political affairs can open the 
rhetorical space necessary for competition policy to promote public 
deliberation, to sustain participatory government, while inspiring 
individual aspirations and economic enterprise.  For competition 
policy to remain a durable good, it must reflect a dialogical sense of 
political economy.  It is in that sense of interdependence between 
liberty and equality, between individual and collectivity, and, 
finally, between “the market” and “the state,” that we find the 




233  See TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE 
DISABLING OF DEMOCRACY 41–45 (2005).  The Boston Tea Party was led and carried 
out largely by Boston merchants, who were neither concerned about “consumer 
welfare” nor “allocative efficiency.”  Rather, they were protecting their rights to 
compete equally on a fair playing field against the attempted “vertical integration” 
sought by the British East India Company.  Id. at 43; see also BENJAMIN WOODS 
LABAREE, THE BOSTON TEA PARTY 60–62 (1964).  
234  See, e.g., NACE, supra note 233, at 46–55.  Thomas Jefferson, for example, 
expressed grave concerns in 1816 concerning the potential of “monied corporations” 
challenging the strength of the federal government, and “bid[ding] defiance to the laws 
of our country.”  Id. at 46 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Tom Logan (Nov. 
1816), in PAUL LEICESTER FORD, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, VOL. 10 69 
(1892-1899)).  
235  JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 267 
(2008). 
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expressed similar concerns about powerful aggregations of capital threatening 
our democracy in a letter to businessman and friend William Elkins in 
November 1864, while the Civil War was still raging.236  Henry Adams, the 
grandson and great-grandson of two American Presidents, also expressed deep 
fears in 1870, “that the day is at hand when corporations . . . after having 
created a system of quiet but irresistible corruption—will ultimately succeed 
in directing government itself.”237 
Americans also historically were driven by sacred notions of equal 
economic opportunity on a fair playing field.238  For example, in 1864, Lincoln 
told a group of Ohio soldiers returning home from the Civil War that America 
represented “an open field and a fair chance for your industry, enterprise, and 
intelligence; that you may all have equal privileges in the race of life, with all 
its desirable human aspirations.”239  President Lincoln’s speech typified a 
growing American belief that true freedom and liberty could not exist in 
“situation[s] of extreme economic inequality” and economic unfairness.240 
Against these fundamental visions of American freedom, the early 
antitrust Congresses had to balance the growing social, political, and economic 
philosophies and ideologies of Social Darwinism and its attendant rhetoric of 
“survival of the fittest,” laissez-faire economics, and the supposed efficiencies 
                                                          
236  NACE, supra note 233, at 14–15 (quoting Letters from Abraham Lincoln to Col. 
William Elkins (Nov. 21, 1864)); see also EMANUEL HERTZ, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A 
NEW PORTRAIT, VOL. II 954 (1931).  A number of critics have questioned the 
authenticity of the quoted letters, but no definitive proof backing this claim exists. 
237  NACE, supra note 233, at 15 (alteration in original) (quoting The New York Gold 
Conspiracy, WESTMINSTER REV. (1870)). 
238  See, e.g., HOFSTADTER I, supra note 26, at 10 (discussing how nineteenth 
century American traditions of political revolt revolved around attacking monopolies 
and “against limits upon the avenues of personal advancement”).  
239  DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 653 (2005) (citing Abraham Lincoln, Speech to One Hundred 
Sixty-Sixth Ohio Regiment (Aug. 22, 1864), in VII COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 512 (2001)). 
240  See, e.g., SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE: FROM THE 
DEATH OF LINCOLN TO THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 323–27 (1993); ERIC 
FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 126–30 (1998); PERITZ, supra note 63, at 
11 (“Progressives and some conservatives understood the proliferation of large-scale 
commercial enterprise as a new form of commercial genius that exploded rough 
equality and economic independence.”); W. SCOTT MORGAN, HISTORY OF THE WHEEL 
AND ALLIANCE, AND THE IMPENDING REVOLUTION 15–17 (1889) (describing how 
trusts were “demoralizing in [their] influence, inconsistent with free institutions and 
dangerous to our liberties”); THORELLI, supra note 26, at 147 (quoting HAROLD V. 
FAULKNER & MARK STARR, LABOR IN AMERICA 67 (1944)) (“Many, perhaps most, 
workers [in 1890] felt a natural affinity with other economically less favored groups 
who were trying ‘to bring back some equality of opportunity.’”). 
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of corporate and capital concentrations.241  In this neo-Darwinian world, “the 
most ruthless and unfair business practices . . . seem[ed] to be justified” to 
ensure the “survival of the fittest” and overall societal progress.242  As put by 
historian Richard Hofstadter, “[w]ith its rapid expansion, its exploitative 
methods, its desperate competition, and its peremptory rejection of failure, 
post-bellum America was like a vast human caricature of the Darwinian 
struggle for existence and survival of the fittest.”243  According to historians 
Eric Foner and Richard Hofstadter, “social Darwinism served the needs of 
those groups that controlled the ‘raw, aggressive, industrial society’ of the 
Gilded Age.  Spencer, Sumner, and the other Social Darwinists were telling 
businessmen and political leaders what they wanted to hear.”244  Social 
Darwinism in economics was supported by the growing ideologies of liberty 
of contract, protection of private property, and laissez-faire non-interference 
with economic relationships.245 
                                                          
241  See, e.g., FONER, supra note 240, at 119–23; HOFSTADTER III, supra note 24, 
at 118–21 (“In a society of great collective aggregates, the traditional emphasis upon 
the exploits of the individual lost much of its appeal.  The old problem of defending 
competition from critics on the left now paled as people were forced to face ‘the curse 
of bigness,’ the more imminent threat to competition from the offspring of competition 
itself.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 
645, 645–50 (1985). 
242  Richard McCarty, Business and Benevolence, in BUSINESS ETHICS: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL READER 46–47 (Thomas I. White ed. 1993); see also Louis D. 
Brandeis, Competition, in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS 
D. BRANDEIS 112, 115 (Osmund K. Fraenkel ed. 1935) (“[I]t is not competition to 
resort to methods of the prize ring, and simply ‘knock the other man out.’  That is 
killing a competitor.”); CASHMAN, supra note 240, at 61 (describing how Rockefellers 
bought out his competitors “at knockdown prices” while Carnegie “simply squeezed 
them out by cutthroat competition”).  
243  HOFSTADTER III, supra note 31, at 44. 
244  FONER, Introduction to HOFSTADTER III (Beacon Press ed., 1992), supra note 
31, at xvi. 
245  William Graham Sumner, perhaps Social Darwinism’s greatest proponent, 
believed that government should exist only to protect private property, and “not to 
upset social arrangements decreed by nature.”  FONER, supra note 240, at 122; see also 
JAMES W. BROCK, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 332 (13th ed. 2016) 
[hereinafter BROCK I] (“The Darwinian criticism has long held that a laissez-faire 
policy best promotes economic performance by nurturing natural selection among the 
economically fittest firms.”); FONER, Introduction to HOFSTADTER III (Beacon Press 
ed., 1992), supra note 31, at ix, xix (describing how the roots of legal thought 
supporting Social Darwinism lay “in classical economics and a preoccupation with 
defending property rights and limiting the power of the state”); William Graham 
Sumner, The Concentration of Wealth: Its Economic Justification, in ON LIBERTY, 
SOCIETY, AND POLITICS: THE ESSENTIAL ESSAYS OF WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER 149–
50, 155 (1992) (describing monopolies as the naturally selected economic agents of 
society);. 
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Congress was also faced in 1890, and again in 1914, with the growing 
political power of the trusts, monopolies, and great aggregations of capital, 
which threatened Americans’ longstanding historic values of divided and 
diluted political and economic power.246  Professor Peritz, for example, has 
observed that “[a]s the [Sherman Act] legislative debates demonstrate, the loss 
of political liberty itself became an issue.”247  “[Senator] Sherman and his allies 
believed that rough competitive equality was important not only for economic 
or vocational liberty, but for political liberty in a free society as well.”248  
Senator Hoar warned that the trusts were “a menace to republican institutions 
themselves,”249 while Senator Sherman feared the ability of the trusts to 
“disturb social order.”250  Thus, “the political impulse behind the Sherman Act 
was clearer and more articulate than the economic theory.”251  Similar to the 
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act also sought “to decentralize power for social 
                                                          
246  See, e.g., HOFSTADTER I, supra note 26, at 227–29 (discussing the growing fears 
in America “founded in political realities—the fear that the great business 
combinations, being the only centers of wealth and power, would be able to lord it 
over all other interests and thus to put an end to traditional American democracy”); 
HOFSTADTER III, supra note 31, at 118–20 (“The middle class citizen, as producer and 
consumer, was beginning to feel the growth of monopoly and to fear that he would be 
ground between large combinations of capital and labor.”). 
247  PERITZ, supra note 63, at 24.  Professor Peritz further noted that “[t]he concern 
for consumer and producer liberty also implicated political liberty . . . [Senator] 
Sherman was invoking the fundamental belief that representative government 
depended upon an economically independent citizenry, whose independence was 
served by widespread ownership of private property.”  Id. at 15; see also Lande, supra 
note 40, at 99 (“Alarm over corporate aggrandizement of economic, social, and 
political power pervaded the [Sherman Act] debate.”). 
248  PERITZ, supra note 63, at 15. 
249  21 CONG. REC. 3,146 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar).  
250  Id. at 2,460 (statement of Sen. Sherman).  Senator Sherman added that 
“[s]ociety [was] now disturbed by forces never felt before.”  Id. at 2457; see also 
HOFSTADTER II, supra note 26, at 197 (“A nation that had gone so fast from 
competitive small enterprise to corporate giantism might readily go with equal speed 
from corporate giantism to a system of monopolistic tyranny.”). 
251  HOFSTADTER II, supra note 26, at 205.  Professor Hofstadter added that the 
legislators “were reasonably clear about what they were trying to avoid: they wanted 
to keep concentrated private power from destroying democratic government.”  Id. at 
206–07; see also PERITZ, supra note 63, at 15 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2,460 (1890) 
(statement of Sen. Sherman)) (“‘[I]ndustrial liberty’ called for entrepreneurial 
independence, for preservation of the ‘small dealers and worthy men’ threatened by 
the new economic order of large-scale enterprise.”); Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1051 
(discussing the “political values” behind our antitrust laws, including “a fear that 
excessive concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political 
pressures”). 
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and political reasons.”252   
Moral and ethical values and goals also were paramount in Congress’s 
minds in passing the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts.  As noted by Professor 
Hofstadter, “the competitive process was believed to be a kind of disciplinary 
machinery for the development of character, and the competitiveness of the 
people—the fundamental stimulus to national morale—was believed to need 
protection.”253  Monopolies were seen as “morally reprehensible,”254 and 
anathema to fundamental American notions of “full and free competition.”255  
As a result, “[r]epeated references [were] made throughout the [Sherman Act] 
proceedings to the policy favoring ‘freedom and fairness’ in commercial 
intercourse which was violated by the combinations at which the proposed bill 
was aimed.”256  Congress believed that unfair “hindrances to equal opportunity 
were to be eliminated.”257  As noted by Professor Peritz, “[t]his strong 
sentiment in favor of protecting industrial liberty . . . surpassed even the 
abhorrence of higher prices.”258 
Finally, from an economic standpoint, Congress had to deal with the 
wanton and ruthless destruction of competitors and competition being wrought 
by the trusts in the late 1800s and early 1900s.  As previously noted,259 
Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp correctly observed based on both the 
legislative history and other substantial sources, that from an economic 
standpoint, “the proponents of the Sherman Act were significantly more 
                                                          
252  Fox, supra note 13, at 578; Lande, supra note 40, 129 (discussing the evidence 
suggesting that in passing the Clayton Act, Congress was “motivated by concern for 
the social and political power possessed by large corporations”). 
253  HOFSTADTER II, supra note 26, at 200.  
254  THORELLI, supra note 26, at 228.  
255  See, e.g., id. at 226. 
256  THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED 
STATUTES, VOL. 1 20 (Earl W. Kintner ed. 1978); see also id. at 155 (quoting 21 CONG. 
REC. 2,558–59 (1890) (statement of Senator Pugh that the trusts were “contrary to the 
public policy of the United States” because “they hinder, interrupt, and impair the 
freedom and fairness of commerce . . . .”)).  
257  THORELLI, supra note 26, at 314 (discussing the trusts’ perceived negative 
impacts on equality of opportunity); Id. at 327 (discussing “whether individualist 
democracy would be able to persist in the brave new world that was unfolding”); Id. 
at 569 (“The widespread impression that the growth of giant and anonymous 
combinations in business constituted an increasing threat to the cherished equality of 
opportunity took on particular significance in an era when the agricultural frontier was 
disappearing.”). 
258  PERITZ, supra note 63, at 15.  Professor Peritz further observed that “Senator 
Sherman and his contemporaries were concerned with another kind of freedom—
freedom from corporate control of trade and commerce.  Industrial liberty embodied a 
sense of the public as competitors and employees of new large combinations of capital, 
whose power rendered ‘the boasted liberty of the citizen . . . a myth.’”  Id. (alteration 
in original). 
259  See supra Part II.A. 
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concerned about injury to competitors than injury to consumers.”260  
Representative William Mason (R-Ill), for example, pointed out that even if 
the “trusts ha[d] made products cheaper . . ., [they] ha[d] destroyed legitimate 
competition.”261  Both Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson 
expressed similar concerns.262 
Although neoconservative historical revisionists delight in saying that our 
antitrust laws “protect competition, not competitors,” they fail to recognize 
that their artificially created mantra is completely inconsistent with the actual 
legislative histories of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts, not to mention 
the never-repealed 1936 Robinson-Patman Act. Throughout the history of our 
antitrust laws, Congress has recognized that protecting competitors against 
unfair and predatory acts is crucial to protecting competition.263  
 Neoconservative critics also unfairly denigrate Congress’s laudable 
historic insights in progressively recognizing that moral and ethical values and 
norms are fundamental keys to sound economic and competition policy.264  
Indeed, neoconservatives’ assertion that values such as economic fairness and 
competitive diversity are so-called “non-economic values” that are somehow 
concerned “with values other than the economic well-being of consumers or 
the economy as a whole”265 reveal a profound and ultimately biased 
                                                          
260  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 55.  
261  21 CONG. REC. 4,100 (1890) (statement of Rep. Mason).  Such “view[s] 
derive[d] from the moral precept of Jeffersonian entrepreneurialism and the 
consequentialist rationale that such competition promotes economic prosperity.”  
PERITZ, supra note 63, at 17. 
262  See, e.g., DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, BULLY PULPIT: THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, AND THE GOLDEN AGE OF JOURNALISM 254 (2013) 
(discussing President Roosevelt’s concern with “unfair competition, resulting in the 
crushing out of competitors”); id. at 730 (discussing President Wilson’s belief in “fair 
play” and the need to “open again the fields of competition, so that new men with 
brains, new men with capital, new men with energy in their veins, may build up 
enterprises in America”). 
263  See Harrison, supra note 2 at 409–10 n.2 (“Interestingly, the one portion of the 
antitrust laws that is not expressed in general terms is the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 13, which provides fairly clear guidance with respect to interpretation and 
has been redefined by the current Supreme Court.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s 
Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23–24, 44–46 (1989); Horton IV, supra note 
12, at 623–34 (detailing the history of the “protecting competition, not competitors” 
mantra, and showing its inconsistency with the goals of the Sherman, Clayton, and 
Robinson-Patman Acts); Andreas Koutsoudakis, Antitrust More Than a Century After 
Sherman:  Why Protecting Competitors Promotes Competition More Than 
Economically Efficient Mergers, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 223, 230 (2009) (“Protecting 
competitors is one main purpose for which Congress enacted antitrust legislation.”); 
Kovacic, Intellectual DNA, supra note 25 at 80–81; Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1058–
59; see also Robinson-Patman Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 21a (1936). 
264  See, e.g., Horton II, supra note 12, at 46.  
265  See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 35.  
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misunderstanding of the fundamental requisites for a stable, healthy, and 
sustainable competitive economic ecosystem.  
As seen, our early antitrust Congresses faced a conflicting and diverse 
array of fundamental ideologies and values in seeking to enact laws that would 
control the growing problem of trusts and monopolies dominating our 
economy.  The chart below sets forth some of the fundamental 




Comparing the values chart above to those set forth in Parts II.B and II.C., 
one can see that Congress has continued to face similar philosophical and 
ideological conflicts for more than a century.  Throughout this time, Congress 
has shown the ability to balance and blend our conflicting values and 
philosophical differences, and to enact legislation with the potential to advance 
fundamental American values and democratic goals—by “deal[ing] with 
concentrations of economic power and . . . polic[ing] business behavior that 
exploit[s] consumers and exclude[s] competitors.”266  Given the deep 
fundamental philosophical and ideological conflicts Congress has had to 
balance, it is hardly surprising that Congress consistently has chosen to enact 
flexible constitutional-like antitrust laws that allow for growth and judicial 
development.   
It is time for our Executive and Judicial branches to do their part to begin 
addressing “antitrust’s democracy deficit.”267  A good starting point would be 
more faithfully honoring and implementing such congressional goals as 
protecting competition by: guarding competitors against unfair predation; 
preventing undue concentrations through more aggressive merger control; 
                                                          
266  First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2573. 
267  Id. 
Social 
Equal opportunity v. Freedom of 
contract 
Moral and Ethical 
Fair competition v. Survival of the 
fittest 
Political 
Divided power/democracy v. 
Protection of private property 
 
Economic 
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continuing to prevent anticompetitive collusion while encouraging R&D joint 
ventures; and preserving the dynamic efficiencies and technological 
innovations resulting from a diverse array of aggressive competitors at all 
competitive levels.  
 
IV. REDISCOVERING ANTITRUST’S LOST HISTORIC AMERICAN VALUES 
 
Conservative antitrust commentators rejoice today in claiming that “the 
powerful impact of economic analysis” has led to an American antitrust system 
that “has become relatively politics-agnostic.”268  In their view, the courts and 
executive branch’s deference to neoconservative economic ideologies have 
“yield[ed] a body of widely accepted law that is largely impervious to political 
intrusion.”269  Neoconservative economics having finally captured the day, 
little remains “open to legitimate disagreement.”270   
This author respectfully disagrees.  Putting aside the differing impacts of 
“the ideological differences” between the antitrust enforcers of recent 
administrations,271 there is little doubt that American “[a]ntitrust has moved 
too far from democratic institutions and toward technocratic control, in service 
to a laissez-faire approach to antitrust enforcement.”272  American courts and 
enforcers have lost sight of the fundamental values balanced and blended by 
Congress for more than 100 years to create a set of regulatory checks and 
balances designed to protect our economic system from undue concentrations 
and exercises of economic power and their “destructive consequences in a free 
society.”273  In so doing, they have precipitated a “destructive alienation” of 
                                                          
268  Voorhees, supra note 1, at 558, 576; see also id. at 562 (noting that over the 
past forty years, “economics analysis has taken a central place in the antitrust thinking 
of the U.S. Supreme Court as well as the lower courts”). 
269  Id. at 576; see also Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 948 (1979) (“Differences remain, but increasingly 
they are technical rather than ideological.”). 
270  Voorhees, supra note 1, at 576.  
271  See, e.g., Salop, supra note 26, at 638.  
272  First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2574; Harrison, supra note 2, at 422.  
273  James W. Brock, Economic Power, Henry Simons, and a Lost Antitrust Vision 
of Economic Conservatism, 58 S.D. L. REV. 443, 443 (2013); see also id. at 461 (“The 
decisive role of antitrust policy in meeting that challenge [of making markets work], 
and in limiting the destructive consequences of private economic power in a free 
society, constitutes the lost vision of one kind of economic conservatism.”); WALTER 
ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND 
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 7 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter ADAMS & 
BROCK II] (“[T]he essence of power is dominance.  And dominance may arise simply 
from disproportionate size.  It entails an absence of effective constraints, a freedom 
from accountability, and a relative immunity from sanctions.”); HENRY C. SIMONS, 
ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 43–44 (1948) (“Political liberty can survive 
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antitrust from our most fundamental and essential historic American social, 
political, moral, and economic values.274 
Congress has had ample opportunities to incorporate into our antitrust laws 
neoconservatives’ economic philosophies, but has never done so.  As seen, 
Congress easily could have done so in passing the HSR Act in 1976, in 
enacting the NCRA in 1984, or in amending the NCRPA in 1993 and 2004.  
However, in each case Congress declined to do so even though 
neoconservative economic ideologies were then largely ascendant.  Instead, 
Congress chose in 1976, 1984, 1993, and 2004, to strengthen our antitrust laws 
while adding a relatively limited set of exceptions to the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts.  Consequently, our courts and antitrust enforcement agencies should stop 
interpreting our antitrust laws as though they were somehow written or 
amended by Congress to bless neoconservatives’ social, political, moral, and 
economic ideologies.  
We also need to stop treating neoconservatives’ economic values as a 
supposedly neutral set of scientifically objective economic laws.  The 
preceding review of our antitrust laws’ legislative histories and the history 
surrounding them shows that the modern neoconservative economic 
philosophies of today are eerily reflective of the laissez-faire values put 
forward by the Social Darwinists in the late 1800s, which have been 
consistently rejected by Congress.  Although wrapped in claims that modern 
neoconservative economics are “of course a science,”275 modern evolutionary 
biology and economics have shown the alleged scientific bases of Social 
Darwinism to represent a misguided and fundamental misreading of Darwin’s 
discoveries.276  It is time therefore to stop treating neoconservative economics 
and its attendant laissez-faire antitrust implications as hard unrefuted science.  
We should instead begin recognizing neoconservative economic ideologies for 
the values-laden political, social, moral and economic ideologies they are.  By 
doing so, we can return to balancing and blending in our antitrust analyses the 
                                                          
only within an effective competitive economic system.  Thus, the great enemy of 
democracy is monopoly, in all its forms . . . .” (emphasis in original). 
274  HOFSTADTER I, supra note 26, at 21.  
275  BORK I, supra note 3, at 8; see also PERITZ, supra note 63, at 228 (discussing 
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973)) (observing that Judge 
Richard Posner has long argued that the promotion of economic efficiency is “positive, 
not normative; scientific, not ideological”). 
276  See, e.g., BROCK I, supra note 245, at 335 (noting that neoconservative 
economists “may have fundamentally misread Darwin and Schumpeter”); ANTITRUST, 
THE MARKET, AND THE STATE: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF WALTER ADAMS 250–51 (J. 
Brock & K. G. Elzinga eds. 1991) (portraying Judge Bork’s concentration efficiencies 
arguments as outmoded social Darwinism); Thomas J. Horton, Efficiencies and 
Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective, 60 ANTITRUST BULL. 168, 186 
(2015) [hereinafter Horton V].  See generally Horton II, supra note 12; Horton III, 
supra note 12. 
2018  REDISCOVERING ANTITRUST’S LOST VALUES 241 
 
fundamental American political, social, moral, and economic values that 
Congress has paid homage to for more than a century.  
Pursuing such goals will require us to stop classifying and characterizing 
any values not supported by neoconservative economic ideologies as “non-
economic goals” undeserving of antitrust’s protection.  As previously argued, 
values such as competitive fairness, level economic playing fields, economic 
justice, a healthy diversity of competitors, and reduced economic 
concentration are actually crucial economic values in the sense that they 
provide the foundational underpinnings for a healthy, stable, and sustainable 
capitalistic economic system.277  Attempts to label them as “non-economic 
values” are therefore overly simplistic and conclusory, and provide a rhetorical 
justification for wrongfully denying their powerful progressive economic 
implications—implications which call into serious question neoconservatives’ 
own economic philosophies, which favor increasing economic concentration 
and the economic justification of all manner of unethical, immoral, and 
economically harmful predatory conduct.278   
Neoclassical economics are neither scientifically neutral nor free from 
normative social, political, and moral values and ideologies.279  Indeed, 
                                                          
277  See, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 442 (2013) (“Because fairness 
normally matters more than anything else, it should be an obsession with 
policymakers.”); BROCK I, supra note 245, at 332–36 (discussing the importance of 
diverse competition and economic opportunity at all levels of our economic system to 
ongoing economic innovation and progress); Horton I, supra note 2, at 863 
(“Evolutionary biologists and behavioral economists increasingly appreciate and 
demonstrate how fundamental and critical our sense of fairness has been to our long-
term evolutionary and economic success.”); Horton II, supra note 12 (arguing that a 
stable and healthy economic system must be grounded by moral and ethical roots); 
Horton V, supra note 276, at 186 (“Economic diversity, variability, and opportunity, 
rather than increasing concentration and speculative short-term ‘efficiencies,’ are 
therefore the keys to the overall health, productivity and robustness of our economic 
system.”); Stucke I, supra note 1, at 608 (discussing the importance of ethics, morals, 
and fairness to the functioning of our market economy). 
278  See, e.g., Foer, supra note 3, at 116 (questioning the labeling of various values 
as “non-economic,” and noting that “the line between what is political/social and what 
is economic is not always clear”); Harrison, supra note 2, at 425–26 (arguing that 
neoconservative antitrust economists’ attacks on alternative economic theories and 
values “borders on a kind of intellectual bullying”). 
279  See, e.g., ADAMS & BROCK II, supra note 273, at 302 (“[A]lthough economic 
Darwinism makes superior economic performance the centerpiece of its policy 
position, its advocates concede that measuring such performance is inordinately 
difficult, if not outright impossible.”); BORK I, supra note  3, at 124 (conceding that 
“[t]he real objection to performance tests and efficiency defenses in antitrust law is 
that they are spurious.  They cannot measure the factors relevant to consumer welfare, 
so that after the economic extravaganza was completed we should know no more than 
before it began.”); Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, in MONOPOLY 
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economists Walter Adams and James Brock observe that economic analyses 
in antitrust cases “hinge . . . ultimately on the analyst’s premises, values, and 
belief system[s].”280  As Professor Lao suggests, it is therefore time to deal 
with the real economic values conflicts in antitrust, instead of relying on 
economic proxies that unilaterally declare the values debates to be 




For more than 100 years, Congress has carefully and deliberately balanced 
and blended a diverse array of fundamental social, political, moral, and 
economic values and goals in crafting our antitrust laws.  Although it has had 
plenty of chances to do so, Congress has never adopted or accepted any single 
set of economic objectives, and has never endorsed neoconservatives’ 
economic ideologies.  Instead, Congress has treated Americans’ fundamental 
social, political, moral, and economic values as interdependent, and deserving 
of protection against the menaces of concentrated economic power.  
It is therefore time to return to an antitrust regulatory system that better 
reflects Congress’s dynamic historical balancing of multiple fundamental 
social, political, moral, and economic values.  To do so, we must begin 
rediscovering antitrust’s lost values, and recommence our historic pursuit of 
an ethical, moral, and fair free-enterprise system truly devoted to our long-
term economic and social welfare.  In pursuing such a quest, we can begin 
moving away from our increasing global isolation and growing economic 
inequality.282  We can instead seek a closer convergence with the more 
progressive and enlightened systems of antitrust and competition regulation 
developing in Europe and throughout the world—systems ironically attuned 
and deferential to, and built around, the fundamental historic American social, 
political, moral, and economic values Congress has long recognized and 
sought to protect.  
                                                          
POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL 
CONCENTRATION 160 (Edwin Mansfield ed. 1968) (arguing that “economics offers no 
objective measure of the vitality of competition in all its aspects”); Foer, supra note 3, 
at 116. 
280  Adams & Brock I, supra note 35, at 294; Harrison, supra note 2, at 409 (“The 
core notion of examining all policies, laws, and values from any relevant perspective 
is something that is too often lacking in legal scholarship.”). 
281  See Lao, supra note 4, at 685.  Professor Lao astutely calls for “an honest 
conversation on what values should matter and why . . . and whose interests are 
important and how these interests should be reconciled if they conflict.”  Id.  
282  See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S 
DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012). 
 
